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Catholic Europe. For the sake of clarity, all dates in the older Julian form have been 
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       1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Ernst von Mansfeld  
 
Ernst von Mansfeld was a German nobleman of illegitimate birth, who participated in 
the early phases of the Thirty Years War as a military entrepreneur and mercenary 
commander. Mansfeld first joined the war when Duke Charles Emmanuel of Savoy sent 
him to the Bohemians’ aid in 1618. Mansfeld’s achievements in the Bohemian 
Rebellion were limited to the capture of Pilsen and a military defeat at Sablat. 
Mansfeld’s allegiance shifted from the Bohemian Rebel Confederates to the Count 
Palatine Frederick V, when the Bohemian Estates elected Frederick V as their new King 
in 1619. The irate Ferdinand II, whom the German Electors had chosen as the new 
Emperor that very same year, challenged the Bohemians and the usurper Frederick V 
and defeated them in the battle of the White Mountain in 1620.  
 From 1621 onwards Mansfeld facilitated the war’s escalation into the Holy Roman 
Empire. The dethroned pretender Friedrich V employed Mansfeld first to defend his 
Palatine lands from the Emperor and his Spanish allies, then to wage aggressive war in 
order to win back the Palatinate from the occupying Imperialists. Initially Mansfeld 
joined forces with Duke Georg of Baden-Durlach and Christian of Brunswick to 
promote the Palatine cause. When Frederick V discharged Mansfeld from his service in 
1622, Mansfeld struck out with Brunswick and sought employment elsewhere, first 
making his way to Alsace and Lorraine, then to East Frisia, where the Dutch employed 
him to occupy that land on their behalf. At the end of 1623 Mansfeld dissolved his army 
and travelled to England. 
 In England Mansfeld raised another army to help the Dutch lift the siege of Breda. 
The malnourished, demoralised, and disease-stricken army failed in its mission and 
soon melted away due to lack of forage and pay. With his remaining troops Mansfeld 
entered Germany in 1625 and sought service with the Danish King Christian IV, who 
was waging war against the Emperor in his personal capacity as the commander of the 
Lower Saxon Circle. In Danish service Mansfeld fought his biggest battle, when he was 
defeated by the Imperialist commander Albrecht von Wallenstein at Dessau in 1626. 
After his defeat Mansfeld gathered yet another army and marched south towards the 
Habsburg Patrimonial Lands in Silesia and Moravia. When Mansfeld’s last army 
dissolved under Imperialist pressure, Mansfeld made his own way towards Venice, 
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where he hoped to secure future employment. On his way to Italy Mansfeld succumbed 
to typhus and died in December 1626. 
 
The above entry is the short and standard account of Mansfeld and his role in the Thirty 
Years War. Compared to the great actors of the Thirty Years War, Wallenstein, 
Gustavus Adolphus, and Richelieu, Mansfeld’s role in the war seems modest and almost 
insignificant. Traditional historiography of the war has neglected Mansfeld and others 
of his kind, because private military entrepreneurs, mercenary commanders, and other 
non-state actors failed to promote the darling cause of nineteenth- and twentieth-century 
historians, the advancement of the territorial nation state. While kings and cardinals 
built empires and centralized nation states, military entrepreneurs and mercenary 
commanders fought their war at grass root level, safe from the idolatrous gaze of the 
nineteenth- and twentieth-century historians. Indeed, the dictionary entry in Friedemann 
Bedürftig’s recent lexicon still reduces Mansfeld to “a classical condottiere,” who 
“became great only in war, and lived only for war and from war,” in other words, a mere 
soldier who served to satisfy his own hunger for war.1  
 This dissertation attempts to revise the traditional image of Mansfeld as an anomaly 
and an outcast of early modern state formation. Rather as a failed servant of the nascent 
nation state, the dissertation aims to portray Mansfeld as an early operator in 
asymmetrical warfare, and even a successful one at that. The central question of the 
dissertation is to what extent did Mansfeld’s conduct in the Thirty Years War 
correspond with what we in the postmodern age understand as asymmetrical warfare. 
The dissertation argues that elements of asymmetrical warfare can be identified in 
Mansfeld’s operational conduct of warfare, in his illegitimate and immoral conduct of 
war, in the financing and supply of his armies, in his role as an agent for indirect 
warfare, in his central role in the early modern image and information wars, and in the 
strong counter-reactions his asymmetrical warfare elicited from his enemies. 
 
1.2 Theoretical Approach and Structure 
 
The dissertation is based on the theory of asymmetrical warfare. Asymmetrical is a 
geometrical term meaning something that is not identical on both sides of a central line, 
                                               
1 Friedemann Bedürftig, Der Drei?igjährige Krieg: Ein Lexikon (Darmstadt: Primus Verlag, 2006), p. 
112 
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and generally defined by students of asymmetrical warfare through negatives2 – hence 
the definition for terrorists as being “not a state” but “a non-state,”3 who “employ 
unconventional methods” to wage war.4 The American Joint Staff defines such warfare to 
be asymmetric that consists of “unanticipated or non-traditional approaches to circumvent or 
undermine and adversary’s strengths while exploiting his vulnerabilities through unexpected 
technologies or innovative means.”5 In its most rudimentary form asymmetric warfare has 
been described as “an evolved form of insurgency.”6 
By and large, the use of the term asymmetric has been confined to contemporary 
conflicts, the insurgencies and counter-insurgencies that rage even at this very moment 
in countries such as Iraq and Afghanistan. However, some scholars dispute the novelty 
value of asymmetrical warfare, and instead argue, “that many of the strategic and tactical 
concepts of modern asymmetry are simply restatements of concepts developed decades, 
centuries, and millennia ago.”7 
One reason behind this confinement of asymmetrical warfare to the modern age is 
the emergence of yet another military-theoretical concept, that of fourth generation 
warfare (4GW). According to this theory, Western warfare has evolved through four 
successive generations. The first generation came to be as a result of the Westphalian 
Peace in 1648, when state-raised mass armies first made their appearance on European 
battlefields. This first generation then gave birth to a second one during the Napoleonic 
Wars, when firepower stepped in to replace manpower. In the twentieth century a third 
generation emerged, in which mobility was the dominant military feature over any 
other. At the turn of the millennium came the fourth generation of warfare, a prisoner of 
the postmodern condition. The fourth generation of war, in which no single entity or 
polity holds the monopoly of violence, is described by 4GW as a return to the default 
condition of war that existed before 1648 and the modern state system. Now war has 
                                               
2 Kristian Søby Kristensen, ‘Tourists or Vagabonds? Space and Time in the War on Terror,’ Alternatives 
33 (2008), p. 254 
3 Department of Defense, The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America (Washington D. 
C.: US Department of Defense, 2005), pp. 3-4: http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/2006-01-25-
Strategic-Plan.pdf 
4 Department of Defense, National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism (Washington D. C.: 
US Department of Defense, 2006), p. 13: http://defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/2006-01-25-Strategic-Plan.pdf 
5 Internal briefing for the Joint Staff, June 1998, quoted in Kenneth F. McKenzie and Michael A. 
Flournoy, The Revenge of the Melians: Asymmetric Threats and the Next QDR (Washington D. C.: 
Institute for National Strategic Studies, 2000), p. 2 
6 Thomas X. Hammes, The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century (St. Paul: Zenith Press, 
2004), p. 2 
7 Adam Lowther, ’Asymmetric Warfare and Military Thought,’ in John J. McGrath, ed., An Army at War: 
Change in the Midst of Conflict. The Proceedings of the Combat Studies Institute 2005 Military History 
Symposium (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2005), p. 111 
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become dispersed and undefined to the point where the distinction between war and 
peace has effectively vanished. War has become, in a word, asymmetrical.8  
While there is no clear consensus on what constitutes asymmetrical warfare, a 
number of common signifiers appear in all studies on asymmetrical warfare. The 
operational asymmetry is one of them, and often favoured in the study of recent 
conflicts in Asia and the Middle East. The legality of war and the use of terror as a form 
of asymmetrical warfare is another dominant viewpoint in recent research. Challenge to 
state monopolies of violence and the supply of war is the one theme that is perhaps the 
most germane to the study of early modern warfare. Indirect and diversionary wars 
constitute the focus for studies of asymmetrical war initiation and military escalation. 
Recently much interest has also been directed towards the use of image and information 
as weapons in asymmetrical warfare.9 
The dissertation will be organised into seven chapters. The first chapter will 
provide an overview of the theme, introduce the primary sources, and review existing 
research. The backbone of the dissertation is the way in which asymmetrical warfare 
manifested itself in the war waged by Mansfeld and his mercenary accomplices. The 
second chapter will start off this inquiry by looking at the asymmetries on the 
battlefield, and how Mansfeld and his opponents differed from each other in the ways in 
which they conducted military operations. Particular emphasis will be placed on the 
ways in which Mansfeld and his opponents made use of space and movement. In the 
third chapter the thesis will dive into the murkier stuff, the atrocities and acts of terror 
that gave Mansfeld his reputation as a disturber of public peace and a violator of the 
generally accepted rules of war. The fourth chapter will examine the way in which 
Mansfeld relied on contributions and outright pillage as ways of supplying his armies. 
Conversely this chapter will also shed light on the problems the House of Austria faced 
when it tried to maintain armed forces in the period before Albrecht von Wallenstein 
and his subcontracted Imperial Army. The fifth chapter will look at Mansfeld in an 
international context, as a ‘non-state’ actor and an Imperial subject, who nevertheless 
sold his services to foreign leaders waging their own diversionary wars within the Holy 
                                               
8 William S. Lind, Keith Nightengale, John F. Schmitt, Joseph W. Sutton, Gary I. Wilson, ’The Changing 
Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation,’ Marine Corps Gazette, October 1989, pp. 22-26 
9 See Ivan Arreguín-Toft, How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetrical Conflict (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005); Aki Huhtinen and Jari Rantapelkonen, Image Wars: Beyond the 
Mask of Information Warfare (Riihimäki: Finnish Army Signals School, 2001); T. V. Paul, Asymmetric 
Conflicts: War Initiation by Weaker Powers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994; Ekaterina 
Stepanova, SIPRI research report No. 23. Terrorism in asymmetrical conflict: Ideological and Structural 
Aspects (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008);  
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Roman Empire. The sixth chapter concentrates on those aspects of Mansfeld’s warfare 
that bear resemblance to the modern phenomena of ‘image’ and ‘information’ wars. The 
seventh chapter asks what kind of response did the asymmetric warfare of the German 
military entrepreneur elicit from the Habsburg state. The final chapter offers a 
conclusion of the study. 
 
1.3 Primary Sources 
 
The most useful primary sources for the inquiry at hand are newsletters and pamphlets, 
which look at contemporaneous warfare through the eyes of an outside reporter, 
objectively rather than subjectively. This, however, does not mean that seventeenth-
century publications offer us a disinterested and balanced account of the events, on the 
contrary: the one pamphlet most germane to our needs takes on the shape of an apology, 
and strives to present its protagonist Mansfeld in the best possible light.10 The English 
pamphlets too shared the same penchant for presenting champions of the Protestant 
cause in an uncritical manner. Conversely one should approach the horror stories of 
Mansfeld’s alleged atrocities and transgressions with a pinch of salt, particularly when 
they emerge from the Viennese camp. The best example of the latter type of source is 
provided by the Acta Mansfeldica (?, 1623), which is an openly hostile Catholic 
response to Mansfeld’s own apology. The French newsletter Mercure François seems 
to traverse the middle ground between the opposing views. Even though it already acted 
as the official outlet for Richelieu’s propaganda, the Mercure had not yet developed the 
blatant anti-Habsburg bias that dominated its narrative in the latter phase of the Thirty 
Years War. The leading German news collection Theatrum Europaeum maintained an 
equally neutral overtone, despite the fact that it was being published in the Protestant-
dominated Frankfurt am Main. 
Another substantial corpus of primary sources is formed by letters and official 
documents. These usually shed light on the political and diplomatic aspects of 
asymmetrical warfare, specifically on the way in which foreign powers made use of 
Mansfeld and his armies as means to wage diversionary war against the Habsburgs. 
This dissertation uses sources from Germany, England, Venice, and other countries. 
                                               
10 An appollogie made in defence of the illustrious Prince, Ernestus Earle of Mansfield, Marquisse of 
Castel Novo, and Bontigliers, Baron of Heldrungen, Marshall of the Army of Bohemia, and the Provinces 
Incorporated thereunto, & c. (Heidelberg-London: Edward Allde, 1622) 
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Letters by German princes from the period under investigation are collected in the series 
Briefe und Acten zur Geschichte des Drei?igjährigen Kriege, neue Folge: Die Politik 
Maximiliens I. von Bayern und seiner Verbündeten 1618-1651 (Munich-Vienna, 1966). 
The Anglo-Venetian diplomatic correspondence, published in the series Calendar of 
State Papers, is a particularly valuable source for matters relating to the diversionary 
wars waged by England, Venice, and Savoy. Other documents relating to Mansfeld can 
also be found in secondary works, such as the biographies written by Villermont and 
Ütterodt. The most striking lacuna in the documentary trail relates to Mansfeld’s service 
with the Danish King Christian IV – this is because no printed collection of Danish state 
papers was available at the time this dissertation was being written. 
 
1.4 Secondary Sources and Historiography    
 
Secondary literature on the Thirty Years War can, and indeed does, fill entire libraries. 
The few works covering the life of Ernst von Mansfeld deserve to be singled out from 
this mass. The best work on Mansfeld is Walter Krüssmann’s recent biography, which 
is based on meticulous archival research, and also incorporates all the relevant 
secondary material in order to provide the reader with an up-to-date synthesis of 
existing research.11 No other work comes close to Krüssmann’s tour de force in its sheer 
volume of details. The main deficiency in Krüssmann’s work, however, is the lack of 
meta-level analysis regarding the nature of Mansfeld’s warfare, his military 
entrepreneurship, and his place in the historiography of war and society. 
The most notable biography before Krüssmann’s time was written by Count 
Villermont in 1865. Villermont covered his subject’s entire career in two rather thick 
volumes, which also include extracts from Mansfeld’s personal correspondence. The 
problem with this classic biography is the author’s naked bias. Villermont is best known 
for his equally extensive work on Count Johann Tserclaes Tilly, the General of the 
Catholic League, who as a Catholic Walloon was a hero figure to the Belgian 
Villermont. Mansfeld, on the other hand, was not, and his treatment in Villermont’s 
book is rather unflattering. In fact, in Villermont’s account Mansfeld becomes some 
kind of an anti-Tilly, an evil Doppelgänger, whom Villermont unfavourably compares 
to his own champion: “Autant la figure de Tilly est grande, belle, imposante et pleine 
                                               
11 Walter Krüssmann, Ernst von Mansfeld (1580-1626): Grafensohn, Söldnerführer, Kriegsunternehmer 
gegen Habsburg im Drei?igjährigen Krieg (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2010) 
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d’attraits, autant celle de Mansfeldt est vulgaire, disgracieuse et inspire la rêpulsion,” 
Villermont unflinchingly blasts away in the introduction to Mansfeld’s biography.12  
Other biographies include Ernst Graf zu Mansfeld (Gotha, 1867) by Ludwig Ütterodt 
zu Scharffenberg and Der Grafen Erns von Mansfeld letzte Pläne und Thaten (Breslau, 
1870) by Julius Grossmann. Whereas Villermont vilified Mansfeld as a vulgar 
mercenary, Ütterodt sought to represent him as a forgotten national hero, “a steadfast 
defender of the German religious freedoms, of justice and light, without any memorial books 
dedicated to him or any monuments erected in his name.”13 Julius Grossmann followed 
Ütterodt’s lead, and criticized Villermont’s “one-sided view,” which had “failed to do 
justice to its subject.”14 The fault line in this nineteenth-century debate was a national 
one: on one hand a French-speaking Walloon viewed the German Mansfeld as the 
embodiment of all that was evil in warfare; on the other the stout German historians 
defended their compatriot in the Droysenian spirit of pan-Germanic historiography 
(Grossmann indeed admitted to being commissioned to this task by Gustav Droysen 
himself).15 All these historians did injustice to their subject by anachronistically 
investing him with qualities that were the products of nineteenth-century historiography, 
and thus alien and incomprehensible to Mansfeld himself. 
Mansfeld has also featured in every general history of the Thirty Years War. The two 
most distinguished contemporaneous annalists of the war, the Papal Nuncio Carlo 
Caraffa and the Imperial Count Franz Khevenhüller, were both Catholics and left 
behind a biased view of Mansfeld. The ‘modern’ historiography of the Thirty Years 
War begins with Friedrich von Schiller and his Geschichte des Drei?igjährigen Krieges 
(Leipzig, 1791). In the nineteenth century more publications began to appear all over 
Europe, of which the Geschichte des Drei?igjährigen Krieges (Prague, 1869) by Anton 
Gindely has withstood the test of time better than any other. In the twentieth century 
more monographs appeared, the most popular of them being The Thirty Years’ War 
(London, 1938) by Veronica Wedgwood.  
All these distinguished modern historians were more or less perplexed by Mansfeld. 
Schiller characterized Mansfeld and Brunswick as “fugitive banditti,” who were 
                                               
12 Antoine Charles Hennequin, le comte de Villermont, Ernest de Mansfeldt: Tome premier (Brussels: 
Victor Devaux, 1865), p. iii 
13 Ludwig Ütterodt zu Scharffenberg, Ernst Graf zu Mansfeld (1580-1626) (Gotha: Friedrich Andreas 
Press, 1867), p. i 
14 Julius Grossmann, Der Grafen Erns von Mansfeld letzte Pläne und Thaten (Breslau: U. M. Kern’s 
Verlag, 1870), p. iii 
15 Ibid., p. iii 
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nevertheless “worthy of immortality, had they been but as superior to their times as they were 
to their adversities.”16 Anton Gindely regarded any attempt to pass final judgement on 
Mansfeld as superfluous. He admitted that Mansfeld’s talents for raising armies and 
supporting them were incontestable, but nevertheless viewed his personal characteristics 
unfavourably. Gindely suggested that while the disorders of the time forced Mansfeld 
on his mercenary career, he nevertheless “possessed a natural bent in this direction.”17 
Veronica Wedgwood approached Mansfeld’s formidable and infamous reputation 
with even more moderation. To her Mansfeld was a mercenary captain like any other, 
without such redeeming or damning qualities that would have singled him out from the 
military peers of his age. The virtues Mansfeld had were “those of the soldier only,” yet as 
an adventurer he was less dangerous “than others who were to follow him in the disastrous 
years to come.” The Thirty Years War was for Mansfeld a private matter, an opportunity 
to be exploited: “He saw nothing among the mountainous ranges of European politics but the 
footholds by which he would climb to his personal goal.”18 Wedgwood’s characterization is 
yet to be surpassed in its poetic force and historical insight. However, despite portraying 
Mansfeld’s personality with convincing lucidity, Wedgwood nevertheless stopped short 
of placing him within the wider context of early-modern military entrepreneurship and 
privatised warfare. This task has eluded even the most recent scholars of the Thirty 
Years War. “His motives remain unclear and his actions duplicitous,” Peter H. Wilson 
admits in the latest addition the historiography of the Thirty Years War. “To most, he 
appears the archetypal mercenary who has come to characterize soldiers generally for this 
period.”19 
 
1.5 Previous Research on the Thirty Years War as an Asymmetrical Conflict 
 
No historian of the Thirty Years War has ever approached his subject from the 
perspective of asymmetrical or generational warfare. The preferred historiographical 
reference point has always been that of the centralized nation state, and the preferred 
military theory that of Carl von Clausewitz. While nineteenth-century historians such as 
                                               
16 Friedrich von Schiller, The History of the Thirty Years’ War (London: Henry G. Bohn, 1846), pp. 102-
103 
17 Anton Gindely, The History of the Thirty Years’ War, Vol. I (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1884), p. 
398 
18 C. V. Wedgwood, The Thirty Years War (London: Jonathan Cape, 1938), p. 88 
19 Peter H. Wilson, Europe’s Tragedy: A History of the Thirty Years War (London: Allen Lane, 2009), p. 
325 
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Schiller and Gindely presented the Thirty Years War first and foremost as a religious 
conflict, nineteenth-century historians such as C. V. Wedgwood, Georges Pagès, S. H. 
Steinberg, and Geoffrey Parker shifted the focus of analysis towards the territorial 
nation states and their hegemonic power struggles.20 In the recent Anglo-German 
historiography of Johannes Burkhardt, Ronald G. Asch, and Peter H. Wilson, the 
research emphasis has once again shifted from international affairs to the Holy Roman 
Empire and its socio-political structures.21 Endemic, unorganised, private, or 
asymmetrical wars, however, have not yet risen to a central position in the 
historiography, which is still dominated by the question of European state formation. 
 The problems surrounding early-modern warfare have received more attention in the 
specialist literature. This literature usually revolves around the theory of early-modern 
Military Revolution. While the concept of the Military Revolution has helped military 
historians to shift the focus of research from battles and troop movements towards the 
issues of war and society, it has nevertheless failed to shed much light on the endemic 
‘small wars’ that characterized much of early-modern warfare. Instead much interest has 
been directed towards the technological and organisational innovations of the early 
modern age, developments such as angle bastions, combined arms regiments, and naval 
technology. The theory of Military Revolution has also been used to explain European 
global domination and ‘the rise of the West.’22  
 The only attempt to draw parallels between the Thirty Years War and the endemic 
conflicts of our own age has been made by the political scientist Herfried Münkler. In 
fact, Münkler has even gone so far as to identify German military entrepreneurs like 
Mansfeld and Christian of Brunswick with the warlord militias and other non-state 
military operators in modern-day Somalia, Liberia, and Afghanistan. To Münkler the 
key problem is the monopoly of violence, which Münkler argues the modern state has 
again lost in the face of competition from non-state military operators.23 
 Münkler’s thesis repeats the central themes in 4GW and the writings of political 
scientists such as Kalevi J. Holsti and Martin van Creveld, who have both identified a 
                                               
20 Georges Pagès, La guerre de trente ans 1618-1648 (Paris: Payot, 1949); Geoffrey Parker, The Thirty 
Years’ War (London: Routledge, 1984); S. H. Steinberg, The ’Thirty Years War’ and the conflict for 
European Hegemony 1600-1660 (London: Edward Arnold, 1966) 
21 Ronald G. Asch, The Thirty Years War: The Holy Roman Empire and Europe, 1618-1648 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave, 1997); Johannes Burkhardt, Der Drei?igjährige Krieg (Frankfurt am Main: 
Suhrkamp Verlag, 1992); Wilson, Europe’s Tragedy 
22 Geoffrey Parker, The Military Revolution: Military innovation and the rise of the West 1500-1800 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988) 
23 Herfried Münkler, The New Wars (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005), pp. 32, 45 
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shift in the monopoly of violence. War before the Westphalian state system was messy, 
endemic, and protracted, they argue, and was finally institutionalised in the Westphalian 
Peace as a series of symmetrical duels between nation states and their organised mass 
armies. Now, however, this course of military evolution and state formation is 
completing a full cycle, when non-state actors have begun to assert themselves on the 
theatre of war.24 
  A dissertation on Mansfeld is a way of examining the nature of one such non-state 
operator in the Thirty Years War. Because no previous studies on neither asymmetrical 
warfare in the Thirty Years War nor Mansfeld’s role as a perpetrator of such warfare 
exists, this dissertation claims new ground in the historiography of the Thirty Years 
War. The way in which military historiography and established military theoreticians 
have so far explained the Thirty Years War will be presented in the following chapter. 
 
2. OPERATIONALLY ASYMMETRICAL WARFARE 
 
2.1 Military Historiography and the Thirty Years War 
 
Mansfeld’s military career can be said to have lacked both merit and brilliance. Such a 
dim view would not be entirely unsubstantiated. Mansfeld only ever fought three major 
battles at Sablat, Fleurus, and Dessau; of these three battles both Sablat and Dessau 
were manifest defeats, while Fleurus was something of a tie. Neither did Mansfeld win 
accolade as a siege tactician à la Marquis Spinola: while the forcing of Pilsen was a 
success, it nevertheless remained Mansfeld’s only major undertaking in siege warfare, 
and even then he suffered the ignominy of having surrendered his prize without a shot 
fired in anger.  
It is hardly surprising then that traditional military historiography has felt little need 
to dedicate more than a few trifle pages to Mansfeld and his ilk. Even today military 
history remains rooted in the Clausewitzian tradition, which produced many great 
volumes on the Thirty Years War in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 
Usually such works took on the form of biographies or detailed accounts of specific 
                                               
24 Martin van Creveld, The Transformation of War (New York: Free Press, 1991), p. 139; Martin van 
Creveld, The Rise and Decline of the State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 87; Kalevi 
J. Holsti, Peace and War: Armed Conflicts and International Order 1648-1989 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1991), p. 38; Kalevi J. Holsti, The State, War, and the State of War (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 29 
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battles and campaigns. The perfect example of the former case is provided by Gustavus 
Adolphus, whose numerous biographies overshadow all the other protagonists of the 
war – including historical heavyweights like Richelieu and Wallenstein. The latter form 
of military history is represented best by Hermann Voges’s Die Schlacht bei Lutter am 
Barenberge am 27. August 1626 (Leipzig, 1922), a meticulous study of the fateful battle 
between Christian IV and Tilly, and by Sveriges krig 1611-1632 (Stockholm, 1936-
1939), a massive multi-volume work commissioned by the General Staff of the Swedish 
Defence Forces.  
 The traditional Clausewitzian approach to the Thirty Years War is wrought with 
problems. The most glaring danger is that of anachronism. Nineteenth-century 
historians such as Gustav Droysen, the famous biographer of Gustavus Adolphus, 
evaluated the Thirty Years War from the perspectives of their own ethnically 
homogeneous, religiously uniform, and centrally governed nation states. The central 
questions were always political: “What kind of contribution did Gustavus Adolphus make in 
the contemporaneous European conflict? That is, in what position did he, did Sweden, stand in 
respect to the rest of Europe?”25 The agents of said politics, the kings and the generals, 
always acted out of motives accessible to the nineteenth-century mind, usually in favour 
of national aggrandizement or “for the cause of religious liberty.”26 For military historians 
in particular such assumptions were perfectly valid; after all, had not the great 
Clausewitz himself claimed that “war is a mere continuation of policy by other means?”27 
Therefore military operations had clearly discernible political objectives that never 
failed to make sense. Battles were fought to annihilate the enemy and cities conquered 
in order to expand the power base of the territorial nation state. 
 These traditional views have come under increased criticism from the 1970s 
onwards. Knud J. V. Jespersen in particular has criticized Hermann Voges, who 
described the battle of Lutter as a Clausewitzian Vernichtungsschlacht, and compared 
Tilly to the nineteenth-century German military strategist Alfred von Schlieffen. Such 
unhistorical associations, Jespersen rightly pointed out, were helplessly anachronistic.28 
As another military historian David Parrott has argued, political goals did not in reality 
dictate strategy, and battles were rarely decisive, even though seventeenth-century 
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generals still sought battles with a firm belief in their ability to decisively tilt the scales 
in favour of one side or another.29 
Money and resources were more important in seventeenth-century warfare than 
firepower, tactical insights, or intricate military-political strategies. The lack of transport 
capabilities meant that armies had to make do with whatever resources happened to be 
in their immediate vicinity and strategy was reduced to “a crude concern with territorial 
occupation or its denial to the enemy.”30 
 Rejecting the firmly seated notions of traditional military scholarship is not an easy 
task for the modern historian. A good example of this difficulty is provided by Peter H. 
Wilson, whose recent book attempts to re-evaluate many of the persistent assumptions 
that traditional historiography attaches to the Thirty Years War. Unlike most other 
historians, who focus their story on the politics, Wilson transfers the perspective from 
the cabinet room to the battlefield, and bases his own narrative on troop movements, 
sieges, and other military events. However, because of the aforementioned 
qualifications, seventeenth-century military campaigns lack such clear-cut goals and 
motives that would make them understandable to the twenty-first-century reader.  
Therefore Wilson falls back on commonly accepted terms such as ‘lines of 
communication,’ which explain the actions of seventeenth-century belligerents in a 
language that makes sense to the modern reader, but do not really ring true in the 
original historical context.31  
 
2.2 The Origins of Habsburg Warfare 
 
In terms of tactics seventeenth-century warfare tended to be either positional or mobile. 
Positional warfare was the norm in the west, while the latter form of warfare prevailed 
in eastern Europe, where cities were few and far between, and where armies had to 
cross vast distances in order to reach their enemies. The role of military technology in 
seventeenth-century warfare was generally more limited than historians would like to 
think. In fact, Robert I. Frost, a specialist of eastern-European military history, has 
warned historians from adopting crude technological determinism: 
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For the effectiveness of technology depended fundamentally on the nature of the physical 
and social environment in which it was applied. Thus while cavalry may well have been all 
but useless in the siege warfare which played such a central role in the Eighty Years War 
between Spain and the Dutch rebels, it remained central to operations in eastern Europe 
throughout the period.32 
 
In support of his argument Frost refers to the spectacular lack of success that western 
armies exhibited in eastern Europe, failures such as the poor performance of the Saxon 
army in the Great Northern War (1700-1721),33 but conversely one could also refer to 
the difficulties of the Turks and Tartars in dealing with the angle bastions of western 
defenders. Under such circumstances any conflict between two fundamentally different 
forms of warfare was bound to be asymmetrical. 
The origins of the Austrian military doctrine can be found in the repeated and 
prolonged conflicts between the House of Habsburg and the Ottoman Empire. Most of 
the Imperial and Catholic League commanders who fought Mansfeld at some point or 
another – Marradas, Dampierre, Tilly, and Wallenstein – had participated in the Long 
Turkish War of 1593-1606. That war was fought mainly as a series of sieges in the 
Danube valley,34 which has prompted the military historian Jeremy Black to suggest 
that there really was no clear contrast between western and eastern modes of warfare.35 
The central problem in Black’s argument is, however, that the Turkish invasion was 
effectively thwarted by the positional warfare adopted by the Austrians.  
The Ottomans had traditionally waged ghazi warfare against their Christian enemies 
in Europe. Ghazi warfare essentially meant protracted campaigns carried out by the 
sipahi, a landed military class much akin to the feudal knights of Christian Europe. The 
sipahi fought as cavalry, and were equipped in the medieval fashion with chain mail 
armour, swords, lances, bows, and arrows. Because cavalry formed the nucleus of the 
Ottoman military machine, the sipahi were augmented by other auxiliary cavalry 
contingents, such as the Crimean Tartars. During major military operations, as in the 
siege of Vienna in 1529, the cavalry troops were also accompanied by large contingents 
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of sappers, siege artillery, and infantry, the most famous soldiers among the last being 
the feared Janissaries.  
However, as the military historian John Guilmartin Jr. has pointed out, advances in 
western fortifications technology posed a major difficulty to this traditional form of 
Ottoman warfare. Reducing the angle bastions built in the style of trace italienne 
proved to be beyond the means of local ghazi leaders. Conversely the Ottoman 
fortifications themselves – the barricaded Janissary camps and the dilapidated medieval 
castles of the sipahi – were highly vulnerable in the face of the more advanced western 
siege craft.36 The Austrian commander Giorgio Basta understood the value of fortified 
positions as force multipliers, and could therefore wage asymmetrical warfare against a 
numerically superior enemy. The Austrians could hardly hope to defeat the Ottomans by 
positional warfare alone, but by that way they could, and did, frustrate the Ottomans’ 
plans of extending Turkish power into Habsburg-held Royal Hungary.  
Outside the angle bastions the Ottoman army still reigned supreme: the only real 
battle in the Long Turkish War ended in a Turkish victory at Mezökereszstes in October 
1596,37 and Günhan Börekci has convincingly argued that other western military 
advances such as volley fire by musketeers had already been successfully adopted by 
the Turks.38 Therefore Basta could not claim victory over the Turks, and the war ended 
in a compromise solution with the truce of Zsitva Török on 11 November 1606. 
 
2.3 Mansfeld and Military Space  
 
It is proverbial that generals always prepare for the last war. That saying certainly 
applies to the seventeenth-century Austrian Habsburgs, whose archenemies the 
Ottomans still were. It is therefore hardly surprising that the Austrian military doctrine 
in 1618 called for the deployment of strongly fortified garrisons and siege works to 
counter the expected Ottoman cavalry threat. Ernst von Mansfeld, who had learned his 
military trade in the service of the Habsburgs, was naturally a proponent of that very 
doctrine. Consequently Mansfeld’s first military undertaking in the Bohemian Rebellion 
was the siege of Pilsen in August-November 1618. At the time most of Bohemia was in 
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the hands of the rebels, and only a few loyalist enclaves survived in Pilsen, Budweis, 
and Krummau.39  
Mansfeld’s performance in the siege of Pilsen was not impressive. The town’s walls 
had offered adequate protection against the Hussites in the fifteenth century, and the 
town still boasted “a deepe ditch, and double walls, grounded vpon a rock, and full of a great 
number of towers.”40 Besieging the town was therefore a demanding enterprise that 
would have required thorough preparations, which Mansfeld had not made. Mansfeld 
undertook the siege with only six field pieces, and even when they finally did manage to 
breach Pilsen’s medieval walls, their combined firepower was not enough to impress the 
defenders into surrendering their position.41 Only after Mansfeld had dragged bigger 
cannons from Prague, and the town’s governor Felix Dornham had lost his life in the 
ensuing artillery bombardment, did the defenders finally offer to negotiate over Pilsen’s 
surrender.42 
In 1621 Imperialist cunning finally forced Mansfeld to relinquish his position in 
Pilsen and adopt a more mobile form of warfare. While Mansfeld was away in Ulm 
beseeching assistance from the Protestant union, his garrison in Pilsen sold the town to 
Imperialists for 200,000 florins.43 The absence of a territorial base forced Mansfeld to 
adopt a mobile form of war. The new war on the run had a destabilizing effect on the 
Habsburg strategy, which sought to contain the troubles inside the Erbländer. In the 
concept of asymmetrical warfare mobility indeed plays a much more central role than 
the possession of terrain.  
Kristian Søby Kristensen has argued that all the actors in the on-going ‘war on 
terror’ are measured according to their ability to function in time: “Speed, instantaneous 
movement, and virtuality are seen as the most important characteristics of this war.”44 In his 
article on the current war on terror Kristensen uses the sociologist Zygmunt Bauman’s 
concepts of tourists and vagabonds to construct a framework for understanding the role 
of space in modern asymmetrical warfare. Bauman argued that postmodern space could 
be experienced in two ways, either as freedom or as slavery. The first experience is that 
of tourists, who move or stay at their hearts’ desire. The second experience belongs to 
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vagabonds, who are forced to move because they are not welcome anywhere they stop: 
“The tourists move because they find the world within their reach irresistibly attractive. The 
vagabonds move because they find the world within their reach unbearably inhospitable.”45  
These roles certainly seem to fit Mansfeld and his Imperialist/Catholic League 
adversaries. After the loss of Pilsen, Mansfeld adopted a style of warfare that was 
increasingly mobile and unorthodox. Space became the critical component in this new 
war. In Kristensen’s application of the Bauman model, “warfare is won by imposing space 
on the opponent, making the opponent the vagabond, while maintaining one’s status as a 
tourist.”46 This was the strategy that Mansfeld begun to pursue in 1621.  
Mansfeld’s retreat into the heavily forested and hilly Upper Palatinate was his first 
application of operationally asymmetrical warfare. The difficult terrain offered 
Mansfeld protection, while forcing his pursuer Tilly to choose routes that were 
susceptible to ambushes. And an ambush was exactly what Tilly had in store for him. In 
July 1621 Mansfeld surprised an advance guard of Wurzburger cavalry under the 
command of Colonel Bauer de Eisenech, and slaughtered them to the last man. He then 
attacked a column of Bavarian reinforcements that Duke Maximilian had sent to Tilly’s 
aid, and dispersed them too.47 On July the 18th Mansfeld attacked Tilly’s main force in 
its encampment. The Mansfelder assault was spearheaded by a combination of artillery 
and musketeers, which at the time was a highly unorthodox tactic.48  
According to an English military treatise from 1628, the use of artillery as the 
spearhead of an attacking formation was not characteristic of central-European warfare: 
“The planting of Ordnance in the Front of the maine Battaile, betweene the interuals, to breake 
the Enemies Battalia, was, and is at this day practiced by the Turkes, and other Nations.”49 The 
other nations alluded to in the treatise were the Swedes, who at the time of the 
publication deployed mobile light artillery, the so-called ‘leather cannons,’ against their 
opponents in the Polish War. Mansfeld appears to have been the first commander to 
introduce such mobile artillery tactics to the German battlefields. 
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2.4 Mansfeld and Mobile Warfare 
 
Mobile war was Mansfeld’s greatest operational innovation in the Thirty Years War, 
even though in 1620 Mansfeld had still advised Frederick V to resort to positional 
warfare as the best form of defence against the Habsburg armies, which at the time 
consisted largely of Hungarian and Walloon cavalry.50 The Bohemians should not 
engage the Imperialists on open ground, Mansfeld advised the Winter King, but should 
retreat into four fortified bastions in Pilsen, Písek, Tabor, and Wittignau:  
 
But these foure places being fortified this manner, that storme may be stayed at the brinke, 
while the Prince of Anholt comes out of Austria, to aide those that are in extremitie. And by 
this meanes we may withstand the enemies forces this yeere, and in the meane time your 
Maiestie may haue leisure to thinke vpon the meanes how to repulse them altogether, better, 
than you can doe now.51 
 
The Bohemians’ defeat at the White Mountain in November 1620 and Mansfeld’s own 
consecutive banishment to the Upper Palatinate in 1621 changed these views 
permanently. After the Catholic League army in the Upper Palatinate had received 
reinforcements from the Bavarian Duke, Tilly in his turn went on the offensive, and 
forced Mansfeld to seek safety within the walls of Weidhausen. In Weidhausen 
Mansfeld was well and truly cornered and closer to utter annihilation than ever before. 
The town was short of supplies, and the crowding of soldiers and civilians inside the 
town’s walls gave rise to a pestilence that threatened to wipe out the entire army. 
Mansfeld, who realized that it was better to be the tourist rather than the vagabond, 
chose the only possible way out of the conundrum, and decided to escape from the 
Upper Palatinate, thus abandoning positional warfare as a mean to promote the cause of 
the exiled Frederick V. From now on space should enable Mansfeld rather than to 
constrain him. 
 Disengaging the enemy successfully was an art of war, in which only few 
commanders excelled. Edward Cooke discussed in his treatise the ways in which some 
commanders covered their retreat by leaving musketeers in convenient places, such as 
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“Woods, Mountaines, Forrests, Rocks, banks of Riuers, Caues, Hils, hollow and deepe wayes, 
Corne-fields, and the like,”52 to wait for the pursuing enemy and ambush him. 
 
Sometimes (as Count Mansfield) they fire houses to stay their Enemies following: and on 
that side the smoake fals (by reason of the winde) they lay an Ambush to intrap the Enemy. 
The like doe you, that the rest of your Army may passe with safetie.53 
 
Mansfeld attempted to use just such a ruse at Sablat, where he attempted to cover his 
retreat by setting fire to the village, and leaving part of his musketeers as a rearguard in 
the nearby forest. Mansfeld also used his wagons as an additional fortification, which 
method of defence he had apparently adopted from the fifteenth-century Hussites. At 
Sablat these ruses did not work, mainly because the wagons failed to cover every gap in 
Mansfeld’s defences. His soldiers were consequently trapped by Buquoy’s Hungarian 
cavalry and cut down before they could reach the safety of the woods.54 Mansfeld and 
the few other survivors were lucky to reach Pilsen alive.  
Made wiser by his experience at Sablat, Mansfeld adopted a new approach at 
Weidhausen. He pretended to enter into negotiations with Duke Maximilian, while at 
the same time making preparations for a hasty retreat into the Lower Palatinate.55 The 
plot worked, and Mansfeld managed to slip away from Weidhausen unnoticed, then 
making his way unhindered 170 miles north in what must have been one of the most 
brilliant military manoeuvres of the entire Thirty Years War. Mansfeld’s escape was a 
major embarrassment to Duke Maximilian: the Emperor had specifically instructed him 
to destroy Mansfeld in the Upper Palatinate, and failing that, to at least isolate him 
there, so that the wily mercenary would not be able to carry the war deeper into 
Germany.56 
 After escaping the Upper Palatinate Mansfeld never reverted to positional warfare 
again. Only in Haguenau did Mansfeld leave behind a garrison in the spring of 1622. Its 
role, however, was primarily to organise the collection of tribute and contributions 
rather than to create a permanent base against the Imperialists. The mercenaries at 
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Haguenau, who were “loath to be behinde their fellowes in glorious exploytes and profitable 
booty” soon joined Mansfeld’s main force after defeating Archduke Leopold’s scattered 
besiegers in a fierce sally.57 From 1621 onwards Mansfeld’s warfare was therefore fast 
moving and unpredictable.  
Mansfeld resorted to every available mean to increase the mobility of his troops. One 
such example was provided by the Englishman Sydnam Poyntz, who followed 
Mansfeld into Silesia in 1626: “There wee left our Canons, and there our Pikemen were made 
Dragoniers,” Poyntz later recalled.58 When approaching Olmütz, Mansfeld “comaunded 
3000 musquetiers to bee put in wagons 300 horse marching before them 200 behinde them.”59 
Mansfeld’s invention was brilliant: when he could not turn all the footmen into 
dragoons, he would load them in wagons and make them the equivalent of modern-day 
motorized infantry; by placing some of the cavalry behind and around the wagons, he 
could also make sure the wagons would keep up with the pace of the cavalry.  
Mansfeld’s mobile army was also kept in a constant state of preparedness, awaiting 
any opportunity to launch sudden attacks against unguarded enemy positions. One such 
opportunity arose in 1624, when Mansfeld, informed by his spies of the disarray among 
Tilly’s Catholic League army, launched a lightning attack from East Frisia into the 
neighbouring bishoprics of Münster, Osnabrück, and Minden, thoroughly wasting them 
with fire and sword before Tilly finally managed to ride to the rescue.60 
 If Mansfeld was a tourist who could enjoy an unlimited freedom of movement, Tilly 
on the other hand was a vagabond, who plodded from one siege to another. An English 
newsletter from 1622 clearly illustrates the Imperial/Bavarian predicament. Upon 
reaching the Lower Palatinate, Tilly and the Archduke Leopold held a council of war, in 
which it was decided to consolidate Imperial position in the Lower Palatinate by 
“surprising or enforcing the rest of the Townes.”61 In practice this approach meant the 
besieging of Heidelberg, Mannheim, and Frankendale, which were all strongly 
garrisoned by Anglo-German troops loyal to Frederick V. Nor would the sieges alone 
suffice in the pursuit of this goal. After the towns had been captured, strong garrisons 
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had to be placed in them, “for feare of new reuolts and hurliburlies: for they saw plainly, that 
the people bare a great good will to the Palatine, and would with all conueniency attend the 
restitution, and returne of their first Lord.”62 Even Duke Maximilian felt insecure enough to 
allocate a substantial part of the Catholic League army to garrison duties in his own 
Bavarian towns, whose defences were even further strengthened by placing a number of 
cannons on their walls.63 Positional warfare also required a large siege train of artillery, 
building materials, and engineering tools. The large size of the Imperialist/Bavarian 
supply train made it a heavy burden on the march, and “Einquartierung der Bagage” 
became consequently a major source of vexation for the Catholic commanders.64 
While the Imperialists and Bavarians were thus tied down in positional warfare, 
Mansfeld and his new ally Brunswick were free to impose themselves on the Emperor’s 
erstwhile allies, such as the Lutheran Margrave of Hesse-Darmstadt and the 
ecclesiastical fiefdoms of Franconia, or to seek asylum outside the Empire, as they did 
when they quartered themselves in the French province of Champagne in 1622 and in 
the Dutch-controlled County of East Frisia in 1623 and 1624.  
The fateful battle at Dessau too should be seen in the context of asymmetrical 
warfare. Mansfeld’s assault against a well-fortified bridgehead and a numerically 
superior enemy seems foolhardy at first glance, but remembering Mansfeld’s reluctance 
to get bogged down in a prolonged siege, his aggressiveness begins to make sense. 
Defeat at Dessau certainly did not prevent Mansfeld from assembling a new army in 
1626. Mansfeld’s final campaign that year carried the violence right into the population 
centre of the Habsburg Empire. The primary aim was to weaken the Emperor’s ability 
to furnish new armies from the Patrimonial Lands. That, however, was not the only goal 
behind Mansfeld’s destabilization tactics. As Herfried Münkler has argued, offensive 
asymmetrical war carries with it a political message that is designed to create 
psychological rather than directly physical effects.65 Chaos and destruction in the 
Erbländer would portray the Emperor as being unable to protect his own feudal subjects 
in their homelands, thus alienating the population of the Habsburg heartland from their 
masters. The anticipated result would be either popular rebellion against the House of 
Austria or the Habsburgs’ increased receptiveness to Mansfeld’s own desires (which 
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usually included titles, benefits, and enfeoffments). Such offensive form of 
asymmetrical warfare is usually called terrorism, and should be approached from the 
perspectives of ius in bello and the morality of war. 
 
3. UNLAWFUL WAR 
 
3.1 The Theory of Just War 
 
Mansfeld’s military career, perhaps even his very existence, violated almost every 
notion of ‘just,’ ‘lawful,’ and ‘moral’ warfare in early modern Europe. In the early 
seventeenth century, when the works of Hugo Grotius had not yet been published, the 
leading theorist on the laws of war was Saint Thomas Aquinas. According to his 
medieval principles, all wars were unlawful and sin. War could be justified only under 
three specific conditions. Firstly, war could only be waged by a sovereign ruler, i.e. a 
monarch, and never by a private individual. Secondly, war required a just cause, 
“namely that those who are attacked, should be attacked because they deserve it on account of 
some fault.”66 In other words, unarmed civilians, women and children in particular, could 
not become targets of military operations. Neither could the clergy be attacked, given 
the fact that the Catholic Church could never err and thus deserve punishment. Thirdly, 
the belligerents should have rightful intentions, so that they intend to advance good and 
avoid evil: “The passion for inflicting harm, the cruel thirst for vengeance, and unpacific and 
relentless spirit, the fever of revolt, the lust for power, and such like things, all these are rightly 
condemned in war.”67  
 A form of warfare that was amoral by early seventeenth-century standards was by 
definition asymmetrical as well. Modern understanding of ‘just war’ is based on Hugo 
Grotius and his De iure belli et pacis, first published in 1625, and already publicly 
referred to in the Westphalian peace protocols.68 Grotius’s definition of acceptable and 
non-acceptable warfare confirms to the basic tenets put forward by Thomas Aquinas. 
Thus, according to the military historian Roger W. Barnett, ius in bello, or lawful war, 
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“cannot be waged indiscriminately or disproportionately…Discrimination in war means that 
non-combatants cannot be attacked directly and deliberately.”69 Any form of warfare that 
does not fit this definition is considered to be asymmetrical, often pure terrorism. 
Therefore what is regarded as unlawful warfare in modern times, applies to seventeenth-
century norms as well, and vice versa. Perhaps the only difference comes in the form of 
modern-day understanding of the complexities of the new wars, in which “the effort, 
central to the laws of war to discriminate between the soldier and the civilian is full of moral 
ambiguity as well as practical difficulty.”70 Unlike modern-day leaders, seventeenth-
century rulers lacked the kind of consulting bodies where such moral problems could be 
discussed and rules of engagement formulated. 
 
3.2 The Right to Wage War 
 
Mansfeld violated these moral sensibilities in various ways. First of all, Mansfeld was 
not a sovereign ruler, but a private individual, and therefore did not enjoy ius ad bellum, 
or the right to wage war. Only the ‘state’ operators of the early modern era - monarchs, 
princes, estates, and republics - enjoyed that right. It is therefore no accident that 
Mansfeld’s condemnation in the Acta Mansfeldica begins with an attack against his 
hereditary status, namely stating that he was as an illegitimate heir to the Count Peter 
Ernst, and that Mansfeld’s later claims to the family title were therefore false.71 The 
Appollogie made no attempt to prove Mansfeld’s pedigree was flawless; instead the 
pamphlet concentrated on defending its subject against accusations of treachery against 
the Winter King, particularly over the bloodless surrender of Pilsen.72 The issue of 
Mansfeld’s birth remained an undecided one: to the Protestant posterity he was always 
the Count of Mansfeld; to the Catholic detractors, like his hostile nineteenth-century 
biographer Count Villermont, or even the Mercure François in 1622, Mansfeld 
remained a low-born Bâtard.73 Charles Emmanuel had in fact invested Mansfeld with 
the title of Marquis of Castel-Nuovo, but such an obscure honour was not taken 
seriously by anyone outside Savoy. It is very telling of Mansfeld’s generally perceived 
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lowly status that while he and Christian of Brunswick stayed in London, it was only 
Brunswick who was invited to join the Order of the Knights of the Garter.74 
The question of pedigree and noble legitimacy was no trifle matter, and it continued 
to affect Mansfeld’s role in the war throughout his remaining years. Because Mansfeld 
was not a member of the Imperial Estates, or the sovereign head of a foreign princedom, 
the Emperor could not acknowledge him as a person of importance and enter into 
official negotiations with him. Therefore, when Mansfeld allegedly offered his services 
to the Emperor after the disaster at the White Mountain,75 and again to Tilly and Infanta 
Isabella in 1622, the Emperor and his representatives could not publicly respond to 
these offers, given, as they were, by a private military contractor and not a sovereign 
prince. Instead they were forced to carry out their negotiations with Mansfeld in 
secrecy, or to ignore his approaches completely.  
Even the dignity of an Imperial Ban was above Mansfeld. In January 1621 the 
Emperor placed the Imperial Ban on Marquis John George of Brandenburg, Prince 
Christian of Anhalt, and Count George Frederick of Hohenlose, and stripped them of 
their “honours, grades, dignities, offices, benefices, franchises, liberties, immunities, & of their 
fiefs, territories, & princedoms.”76 Mansfeld, however, had no privileges or fiefdoms to 
lose, and therefore another form of litigation had to be used against him. Instead of 
being placed under an Imperial Ban like the aforementioned members of the Imperial 
Estates, Mansfeld was declared an outlaw in February 1621, and a bounty was put on 
his head (100,000 thalers if taken alive, 12,000 if dead),77 as if he was nothing but a 
common bandit - which the Acta Mansfeldica indeed claimed he was.78 By modern 
standards Mansfeld and his private army would therefore have to be identified with the 
‘non-state actors’ of our own age, in particular with the most illegitimate and abhorred 
ones, such as drug cartels, warlord militias, and terrorist organisations. 
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3.3 Unlimited War 
 
Secondly Mansfeld violated against Aquinas’s rule of limiting warfare to armed 
belligerents. Contemporary accounts are full of stories about atrocities committed by 
Mansfeld and his dogs of war. Some works, such as the Acta Mansfeldica and Nuncio 
Caraffa’s Commentaria de Germania Sacra Restaurata, are openly hostile to Mansfeld, 
and should be approached with a pinch of salt. This, however, does not necessarily 
mean that their descriptions of Mansfeld’s excesses are pure fabrication; rather they are 
exaggeration, if even that. Sydnam Poyntz, who served under Mansfeld’s command in 
1626, provides the most condemning testimony. According to Poyntz, the Mansfelders 
committed a two-hour long massacre in the Moravian village of Weisskirchen, where 
men, women, and children were indiscriminately put to the sword. Poyntz offered no 
explanation for this massacre and made no attempt to defend Mansfeld or even himself; 
the reader is left with the haunting impression that to Poyntz the events at Weisskirchen 
were simply business as usual.79  
Equally compelling evidence can be gathered from the civilian reactions to 
Mansfeld’s presence. Here we must move from Moravia to East Frisia, where the local 
– predominantly Protestant – population rose up in violent rebellion against Mansfeld 
and his troops. The irate peasants killed scores of the latter in brutal manner: Villermont 
recovered from an unidentified source an incident, where one Frisian peasant offered a 
night’s lodging to seven half-famished soldiers in his cottage, and then slit the sleeping 
soldiers’ throats one by one.80 The reason behind this violent popular reaction was the 
Mansfelders’ unconstrained villainy in East Frisia, where they, according to the neutral 
(if not even pro-Protestant) Theatrum Europaeum, “robbed and plundered, violated wives 
and daughters in front of their husbands and parents, and hanged many local inhabitants.”81  
The most convincing evidence of Mansfeld’s wartime excesses comes from the man 
himself. The Appollogie of Mansfield was written first and foremost to defend Mansfeld 
from accusations of treachery and double-dealing against Frederick V, but its 
anonymous writer also used the opportunity to explain away the unbridled rapacity of 
Mansfeld’s troops. Mansfeld, the Appollogie insisted, was not to be blamed for 
behaviour that was consistent with the nature of contemporaneous warfare: 
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Now as we cannot denie, much lesse excuse the excesse and insolencies, which the 
Souldiers as then committed, and did commit during that warre, for it is well knowne, that it 
is impossible to restraine and hold them under Discipline, if their wages be not paid to them. 
Neither they nor their horses can liue by the ayre, all that they haue, whether it be Armes or 
apparrell, weareth, wasteth, and breaketh. If they must buy more, they must haue money, 
And if men haue it not giue them, they will take it where they finde it, not as in part of that 
which is due vnto them, but without weighing or telling it. This gate being once opened vnto 
them, they enter into the large fields of liberty…82  
 
The Appollogie adds credibility to Catholic polemicists such as Nuncio Caraffa, who 
accused Mansfeld of committing “incredible and inexplicable” sacrileges in the 
Franconian bishoprics. There the Mansfelders had not only robbed the churches of their 
holy vessels, but defiled altars and mistreated priests as well.83 Such accusations were 
extremely grave, given the fact that according to the generally accepted rules of war 
holy ground was a demilitarised zone. The Appollogie made no attempt to defend 
Mansfeld, but admitted his soldiers were habitual church-pillagers:  
 
They spare no person of what quality foeuer he be, respect no place how holy so euer, 
neither Churches, Altars, Tombs, Sepulchres, nor the dead bodies that lye in them, can 
escape the violence of their Sacrilegeous hands. Wee know and confesse all this, and to our 
great griefe haue seene many examples thereof.84 
 
However, the Appollogie allocated the heaviest burden of responsibility to the shoulders 
of the early modern state, which had fallen short of its obligations to support and 
maintain armies: 
 
These are the mischiefes of the warre, which makes it become detestable, and abhominable. 
But what? Is it not enough to know it, and to complaine thereof. Wee must preuent the same 
by the true and right meanes, if wee will be exempted thereof. The only meanes to remedy 
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all such disorders, and so may mischiefes, is Discipline: but how shall it be established, 
where money for their pay wanteth?85  
 
There can be no doubt that the lack of morale and discipline was partly derived from 
the character of Mansfeld’s minions themselves. Loyalty obviously was not the 
dominating virtue among Mansfeld’s followers. Desertion rate among Mansfeld’s 
troops varied from one campaign to another, but there were occasions, as during ill-
fated attempt to relieve Breda, when Mansfeld’s army melted away almost in its 
entirety. The collapse of the 1625 campaign can only partially be blamed on disease 
among the troops and the lack of pay. The recruits were pressed into service in England, 
where many local communities saw in Mansfeld’s recruitment effort an opportunity to 
rid themselves of defaulted debtors, vagrants, beggars, criminals, and other riff raff.86 
On their way to Dover these outcasts committed many outrages, “and all the way, as they 
passed, spoiled, as if it had been in an enemy’s country, which was not wont to be so.”87 
Not even high-ranking officers were safe from the lure of better opportunities in the 
opposing camp: after the disastrous battle at Dessau, Lieutenant Colonel Johann von 
Götz defected to the Imperialists’ side, where he went on to pursue a colourful but not 
too successful military career.88 The surrender of Pilsen has already been referred to; the 
actual surrender, however, was not carried out by the town mayor, who paid for the 
ignominy with his life, but by Colonel Fränk, who accepted the Emperor’s bribe, and 
who in spite of his perfidy remained in Mansfeld’s service.89 Joachim von Carpzow, 
whom the modern-day medical profession might very likely categorize as a full-blown 
sociopath, provided the most extreme case of bad character among Mansfeld’s lackeys. 
Two examples illuminate Carpzow’s pathological condition. At one point Carpzow’s 
wife and sister-in-law were captured by reconnoitring Croat horsemen. The indelicate 
Carpzow ransomed his wife, but not his sister-in-law; the latter consequently ended up 
as a camp prostitute for a Croat regiment.90 In 1623 Carpzow decided that his wife had 
committed adultery. The fiendish cad then proceeded to court martial his own wife and 
passed a sentence of death on her. When the executioner hesitated to carry out the 
verdict, Carpzow volunteered to perform the deed himself. Concerned of his own safety, 
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the executioner finally acquiesced to behead Carpzow’s unfortunate wife.91 However, 
not all of Mansfeld’s officers were licentious murderers or adulterous beasts: one 
Captain named Samuel Weiss was lauded by Villermont for his compassionate conduct 
and his good works towards the impoverished East Frisians.92 
  
3.4 The Motive for War 
 
The third violation against the laws of war was caused by Mansfeld’s lack of 
honourable intentions. Malice, thirst for vengeance, fever of rebellion, lust for power, 
avarice, and self-serving ambition were all motives more discernible in Mansfeld’s 
campaigns than desire for peace and universal good. The Bohemian Estates, Mansfeld’s 
first employers, had committed high treason by rebelling against the ordained and 
anointed King Ferdinand II. Serving the Palatine cause was equally dishonourable, for 
Frederick V had effectively usurped the Bohemian throne and therefore fully deserved 
the Imperial Ban, which had turned him and those that served him into outlaws. 
 Mansfeld’s greatest sin was his design to make the war serve his own personal 
interests. Mansfeld’s illegitimate birth prevented him from inheriting his family titles 
and fiefdoms, which all went to his elder legitimate brother. A surrogate for family 
estates was provided by his private army, which served Mansfeld as a kind of a mobile 
princedom that followed him everywhere he went. Military force made Mansfeld the de 
facto ruler of any locality he happened to occupy – for instance Pilsen, which Mansfeld 
ruled from 1620 to 1621 as if the town was his personal possession. Obviously 
Mansfeld’s ambitions went beyond bullying small towns and pillaging abbeys. Like all 
members of the knightly class, Mansfeld too dreamt of glorious titles, high offices, and 
lucrative estates.  
Primary sources certainly suggest that Mansfeld used the threat of warfare time and 
again to blackmail such concessions from Imperial representatives. The Acta 
Mansfeldica claimed he had offered to sell Pilsen to Duke Maximilian for the price of 
an unspecified sum of money and employment for himself and his troops in the 
Imperialists’ ranks.93 The Appollogie, on the other had, argued that it was the 
Imperialists who offered Mansfeld “mountaines of gold” in exchange for Pilsen. 
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Mansfeld refused to “play such a clerkes tricke,” and declined to sell his honour for such 
“a bad bargaine.”94 The most likely scenario is that the price the Imperialists offered for 
Pilsen was at the time deemed too low by Mansfeld.  
In July 1622 Mansfeld engaged in clandestine negotiations with the Infanta Isabella, 
and offered to place his army under her command. The price, however, was high. The 
following terms were quoted by the Flemish envoy Count Henin in his despatch back to 
Brussels: a down payment of 300,000 escudos, a life-long pension from the Infanta, 
possession of the County of Vianden and its dependencies in Luxembourg, and finally 
an official recognition as an Imperial Prince.95  
These had not been the first round of negotiations between Mansfeld and Infanta 
Isabella: earlier in February secretary Pierre-Ernest Raville, a representative to the 
Infanta and the Electors of Mainz and Trier, had offered Mansfeld a sum of 200,000 
thalers and 100,000 ducats if he transferred his army to Bavarian service.96 Mansfeld, 
who at the time had been in winter quarters in Alsace, seems to have been initially 
interested in the offer, but after new allies had appeared on his side in the shapes of 
Christian of Brunswick and Margrave George of Baden-Durlach, Mansfeld turned down 
the offer and joined the other two paladins on a renewed springtime campaign. By July 
Mansfeld’s negotiation position had therefore dramatically altered, and he felt confident 
enough to increase the level of his demands. The new terms were far too exacting for 
Infanta Isabella, who was not even in the position to make Mansfeld an Imperial Prince, 
let alone enfeoff him with territories from the Empire. Mansfeld stayed in the Palatine 
service, but only briefly. Frederick V, who erroneously calculated that rapprochement 
with Emperor was still possible, dismissed the paladins from his service on 13 July 
1622, and Mansfeld was forced to seek employment elsewhere.  
At this point Mansfeld made an offer to Tilly. Mansfeld sent the following letter to 
Tilly on the very same day he was dismissed from the Palatine service: 
 
Monsieur, we cannot conceal from you that we, the Duke of Brunswick and the entire army, 
have been dismissed by the King of Bohemia, in the form and manner, which you can see by 
the enclosed letter. In case it should please His Imperial Majesty to use us, we are ready to 
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enter his service in preference to any other, provided that the arrears are paid to our soldiers, 
and that we ourselves should remain, etc. 
P.S. In case His Imperial Majesty should decide not to use us, it might at least please 
him to stop the proscription launched against us and grant a general amnesty to us as well as 
all the commanders of the army. In fact we will ease our sorties on the Empire the sooner 
you commit your words to get us this favour, and we ask you to avoid any further 
inconvenience by making us a reply as soon as possible.97 
 
The tone of the letter is very different from the list of demands Mansfeld had forwarded 
to Infanta Isabella in February. The reason was that the military situation had drastically 
changed since the winter’s negotiations with Brussels. Baden-Durlach’s army had been 
virtually annihilated at Wimpfen, and Brunswick too had suffered a painful defeat at 
Höchst. It is therefore understandable that Mansfeld, whose primary concern was to 
secure the continued existence of his army, his sole source of income, would waste no 
time attempting to seek new markets for his military enterprise. There was no talk of the 
Palatine cause nor German Liberties: what mattered to Mansfeld was his army’s future 
employment and its past arrears. Everything else was just icing on the cake.  
Unfortunately for Mansfeld, his hard-nosed pragmatism came across as disloyalty 
and cowardice unbecoming of a true gentleman. Mansfeld had unwittingly reminded his 
enemies of his position as a non-state actor, with whom no honourable bargain could be 
struck. Mansfeld’s quickness to change sides after his long-time employer had 
dismissed him did not suggest that his loyalty to the Emperor would run any deeper 
either. As a Bavarian General Tilly had also a very tangible and pragmatic reason of his 
own to reject Mansfeld’s offer straight off: Tilly knew how the Emperor was struggling 
to meet the costs of the Catholic League army, and how in fact he had been forced to 
mortgage Upper Austria and the Upper Palatinate to Duke Maximilian as securities for 
the accumulated arrears. Hiring Mansfeld’s troops and taking up their arrears as well 
would seriously hamper the Emperor’s ability to ever repay his debts to Duke 
Maximilian and the Catholic League, and it might indeed endanger Tilly’s own position 
as the commander of the Catholic League army. Tilly therefore never even bothered to 
reply to Mansfeld’s offer. 
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3.5 Mansfeld in the Eyes of His Employers 
 
To his Protestant employers Mansfeld was just another mercenary commander – not a 
fellow prince who should be treated with the dignity such a rank would have required, 
nor someone who could be authorized to wage war as a sovereign power or be expected 
to follow the rules of war to the letter. Mansfeld’s first compact with the Bohemian 
Estates was quite tellingly pragmatic and cynical. The Bohemians simply appointed 
Mansfeld as a General of the Artillery and a Colonel of a regiment 4,000 strong. There 
was no talk of cash or securities of any form or shape. The Bohemians were destitute, 
and it was their foreign allies who were expected to foot the bill for Mansfeld’s services. 
The only promise the Bohemians could make was to satisfy Mansfeld’s current needs 
“according to the vse and custome of the warre,” which effectively meant licensed plunder. 
The compact ended with a promise “to requite the good endeauors of the said Earle in all 
occasions, by all kinds of good Offices.”98  
The Winter King’s promises to Mansfeld were equally nebulous. Frederick V simply 
promised to acknowledge Mansfeld’s services by all the favours he could afford;99 the 
problem was, however, that the new Bohemian King was almost as broke as the 
rebellious Estates, and could consequently afford very little. Frederick V had counted 
on the enthusiastic support of the German princes and his dynastic allies abroad, but the 
stupor of the Protestant Union and the haughty inactivity of his father-in-law James I 
left the Palatine Elector both bitterly disappointed and hopelessly destitute.100 
Frederick’s personal presence among the Mansfelders in 1622 failed to transfer any 
legitimacy to Mansfeld’s mercenary enterprise, as the Winter King was by then a king 
without a kingdom and an Elector without a voice in the Electoral College; Schiller 
quite rightly compared Frederick’s role in Mansfeld’s army to that of a “fugitive 
mendicant” following a “swarm of plunderers.”101  
Mansfeld’s arrangements with other employers were no less jaded. After their 
dismissal from the Palatine service Mansfeld and Brunswick sought new employment 
from the States General. The Dutch had already invested 50,000 florins in Mansfeld’s 
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military enterprise in October 1621.102 After Mansfeld and Brunswick crossed into the 
United Provinces in the aftermath of the bloody battle at Fleurus, the States General 
agreed to roll them in Dutch service. The agreement between Mansfeld and the Dutch 
was of ad hoc nature. The Dutch initially agreed to enlist Mansfeld for a period of three 
months only, and Mansfeld’s employment was limited to lifting the siege of Bergen-op-
Zoom.103 Mansfeld’s army was never truly incorporated into the Dutch forces, and 
Mansfeld himself was never given any official Dutch rank. His occupation of East 
Frisia too was recognized as being of temporary nature only, and the Dutch never seem 
to have planned transferring the principality from Count Enno to Mansfeld. 
Mansfeld’s services for James I and Christian IV did not significantly differ from his 
earlier relationship with the Dutch. When James I in early 1624 allowed Mansfeld to 
recruit an expeditionary force in England, it was intended by the King that the force 
would be used for the specific purpose of recovering the Palatinate. At the time it was 
not at all clear whom Mansfeld actually served. According to Alvise Valaresso, the 
Venetian ambassador in London, Mansfeld was busy seeking employment in French 
service, while the Dutch regretted having let him go.104 Earlier Mansfeld had 
approached the Venetian ambassador himself, and made vague references to future 
employment in Italy. Valaresso discreetly pointed out the opposition such a plan would 
encounter,  “because public service requires that Mansfelt shall not leave Germany, away from 
which he might be a fish out of his element.” Instead Valaresso alluded to the advantages 
Mansfeld might enjoy by staying in Germany, “where he had acquired so much experience 
and repute.”105 If these words of encouragement come across as a sales pitch to a worldly 
mercenary, it is probably because that was the way they were meant to be received. 
When Mansfeld finally landed on the Dutch coast in early 1625, the policy of 
English neutrality vis-à-vis Spain was still being pursued by the ailing King James. The 
Dutch had expected Mansfeld to help them lift the siege of Breda, but the Stuart policy 
gave Mansfeld the perfect excuse to cower behind the walls of Osterhoult and regroup 
his scattered forces. The Anglo-Spanish war in March 1625 and the death of James I in 
the following month did not induce Mansfeld to abandon his discretion and join the Earl 
of Oxford in his ill-fated attempt to break through Spinola’s siege works around Breda. 
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The fall of Breda in June made Mansfeld’s presence in the Netherlands unwanted. The 
Dutch had only wanted Mansfeld to assist them break the siege of Breda, and after the 
city’s garrison had been fully retrieved according to the terms of surrender, there was no 
further need for Mansfeld’s private manpower. The sooner Mansfeld and his mercenary 
riff raff left the Netherlands, the Dutch thought, the better. 
While the siege of Breda was still going on in the Netherlands, other events were 
unfolding elsewhere in north-western Europe. In May 1625 the Estates of the Lower 
Saxon Circle held a meeting at Brunswick, where it was decided that the Estates should 
form a common Defensionswerk to protect the inviolability of the Circle. For this 
purpose the Estates suggested that their erstwhile leader Christian IV should make a 
‘conjunction’ with Mansfeld and his troops.106 This decision marked a clear departure 
from an earlier policy, when the Lüneburg Kreistag, assembling in March, had 
proclaimed its military preparations were directed “against the Mansfelder and other 
enemies.”107 At that point Mansfeld was clearly regarded as a hostile third party, who 
served his own designs and was therefore liable to be treated as a mere brigand. 
Mansfeld’s previous outrages in the neighbouring Westphalian bishoprics no doubt 
affected his poor image in the eyes of the Lower Saxon Estates and Christian IV. A very 
illuminating example of King Christian’s attitude towards Mansfeld comes from 1624, 
when Christian IV was visiting the palace of the Duke of Holstein-Gottorp. In one of 
the palace galleries Christian IV observed a painting depicting a gruesome scene from 
Livy’s Histories, in which a man was being drawn and quartered. Smiling, the King 
commented: “Det ville ret være Mansfelderens løn.”108 Mansfeld too was reluctant to enter 
the service of the authoritarian Danish King, and attempted to secure employment from 
Lubeck first. Only when his plans for military service under Hanseatic colours fell 
through, did Mansfeld enter into negotiations with the Lower Saxons.109 
In October 1625 Mansfeld was officially transferred from Dutch service to that of 
the Lower Saxon Circle. The Dutch were only too happy to expedite his transfer, but 
Mansfeld himself did not view the prospect of serving Christian IV with much 
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enthusiasm.110 It is quite possible that Mansfeld was already aware of the Danish King’s 
feelings towards him and other representatives of his trade. What Mansfeld did most 
certainly know about Christian IV was that the Danish King was a strict disciplinarian 
who punished severely those that failed him. Therefore Mansfeld kept his distance from 
Christian IV and the Lower Saxon Estates, and instead operated under his own 
command. In the spring of 1626 Christian IV was finally forced to recognise the de 
facto separation between Mansfeld and his confederates and grant Mansfeld an 
independent command of a Danish-German corps.111 Mansfeld’s independent command 
was evident even to his enemies, and in Vienna and Munich the Lower-Saxon 
Defensionswerk was understood to have three separate figureheads: Christian IV, 
Mansfeld, and Brunswick.112 On the battlefield Mansfeld’s independence manifested 
itself in his failure to co-ordinate military actions with Christian IV, and in his design to 
carry the war into the Habsburg Erbländer, which decision Mansfeld made on his own, 
without any prior consultation with the Danish King.113 
 
3.6 The Emperor and the Rules of War 
 
The necessity to follow generally accepted rules of war created an asymmetry between 
the Imperial war effort and Mansfeld. Already during the Bohemian Rebellion 
Ferdinand II took great pains to avoid the kind of excesses and collateral damage that 
went hand in hand with seventeenth-century warfare. Ferdinand II was particularly 
concerned over the inviolability of the Bohemian Jews and Catholics, who formed a 
small but prosperous loyalist minority inside the rebellious Erbländer. The elders of the 
Jewish congregation in Vienna had appealed to Ferdinand II on 5 May 1620, and asked 
him to see to it that the lives and possessions of their Bohemian brethren would be 
protected from Imperialist and Bavarian violence. The Emperor forwarded the Jewish 
concerns to Duke Maximilian, and asked him to make sure the Jews and Catholics of 
Prague would be protected from the marauding Catholic League soldiers. Duke 
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Maximilian, who had a very cynical view of his own ability to control the lusts of his 
mercenaries, only promised to safeguard loyalist lives and possessions “to the extent it is 
at all possible in these unruly times.”114 
 Duke Maximilian’s reservations were perfectly justified, because the Imperialist and 
Catholic League mercenaries indulged in every excess imaginable once they were 
unleashed on the rebellious Patrimonial Lands. The Emperor’s Polish auxiliaries were 
particularly notorious. In a written complaint addressed to Ferdinand II in 1620, the 
Estates of Upper Austria charged the Polish ‘Cossacks’ “with maliciously reducing 
villages and cities to ashes, plundering poor and rich, violating boys and girls, and practicing 
inhuman cruelties.”115 Lower Austria suffered in similar ways at the hands of the Poles, 
who, “sparing neither Protestants nor Papists, procured so great enuy to themselues amongst 
all, in so much that they were partly slaine by their owne fellowe souldiers; namely, the 
Wallons, for committing of sacriledge, and partly were sent prisoners to Creames 
[Kremsier].”116 On their way towards Prague, Buquoy’s armies too committed a series of 
outrages, the most notorious of them being the storming of Písek, which suffered from a 
terrible wasting and plundering at the Imperialists’ hands.117  
None of these excesses were approved by the Emperor or the Catholic League 
commanders. In fact, when Duke Maximilian learned of the atrocities in Upper Austria, 
he ordered the guilty offenders to be sought out and punished in the most exemplary 
manner possible – some even by crucifixion.118 After the theatre of operations moved to 
the Upper Palatinate in 1621, Duke Maximilian exhorted Tilly to impose his authority 
on Catholic League troops in a more forceful manner, his conduct having so far being 
“too subdued and benevolent” to Duke Maximilian’s taste.119 The reason behind 
Maximilian’s desire for stricter discipline was the delicate political situation in the 
Upper Palatinate, where the Bavarian Duke did not wish to needlessly alienate the local 
Estates “through improper behaviour.”120 The only official concession Duke Maximilian 
made to ‘unlawful’ warfare during the Bohemian Rebellion was the pillage of Prague, 
                                               
114 Duke Maximilian to Ferdinand II, 18 October 1620, in Georg Franz, ed., Briefe und Akten zur 
Geschichte des Dreissigjährigen Krieges, neue Folge: Die Politik Maximilians I. von Baiern und Seine 
Verbündeten 1628-1651. Erster Teil, erster Band Januar 1618-Dezember 1620 (Munich-Vienna: R. 
Oldenbourg Verlag, 1966), p. 439 
115 Gindely, Thirty Years’ War, I, p. 217 
116 The Last Newes from Bohemia, with all the adioyning Prouinces that be now up in Armes (London: J. 
Bill, 1620) p. 32 
117 Gindely, Thirty Years’ War, I, p. 238 
118 Ibid., p. 232 
119 Duke Maximilian to Tilly, 17 April 1621, in BANF 1:2, p. 186 
120 Duke Maximilian to Tilly, 15 September 1621, in ibid., p. 356 
 35
which Maximilian allowed to his mercenaries for a period of one day only, and on the 
theoretical condition that Catholic and Jewish houses would be spared from robbery. 
However, as “the soldiers could not conduct a political catechism on every doorstep in 
Prague,”121 loyalist houses too suffered from the molestations of the League’s foreign 
mercenaries.  
It would of course have been counterproductive for the Emperor to purposefully 
employ ‘destabilization’ tactics in his own Patrimonial Lands, whose tax revenues his 
finances relied on. The atrocities and excesses of every sort committed in the 
Patrimonial Lands by the various passing armies did in fact leave behind a terra deserta 
of ruined cottages and depopulated towns, and seriously hampered the Emperor’s ability 
to maintain his own armies, therefore making him even more reliant on outside help and 
less able to pursue truly independent policies in Germany. The kind of licence 
Imperialist and Catholic League troops had enjoyed in Bohemia and Austria could not 
be tolerated in Empire proper. 
 
Ferdinand II had to exercise strict prudence in Germany. During the period under our 
investigation (1618-1626), most of the German Estates were either allied with the 
Emperor or stayed neutral. By acting too rashly in Germany the Emperor therefore 
risked alienating existing friends and potential allies. The Emperor’s tact towards 
German princedoms manifested itself in various ways. Firstly, political discretion had to 
be exercised towards the non-hostile Protestant princes. The Emperor’s first major 
concession to the Protestant princes took place at the electoral meeting at Mühlhausen 
on 20 March 1620, when Ferdinand II and the Catholic Electors promised that there 
would be no attempt to forcefully restore the secularised ecclesiastical territories in the 
Upper and Lower Saxon Circles - at least not without first consulting the local 
Protestant Estates in a legal hearing. The Saxon and Brandenburg Electors were the two 
most powerful princes in Germany, and the Emperor took great care to honour the 
inviolability of their princely territories. Therefore, when Mansfeld, blatantly 
disregarding any concern over Brandenburg’s political neutrality and territorial 
sovereignty, retreated into Altmark after the defeat at Dessau to regroup his forces, the 
pursuing Imperialists were prevented from following their enemy into Brandenburg 
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territory, lest the vacillating Duke Georg Wilhelm be inadvertently pushed into the rebel 
camp.  
 Secondly, Imperial and Bavarian military resources had to be diverted to help the 
Emperor’s distressed German allies. Among them the Catholic bishoprics of the 
Westphalian Circle were particularly vulnerable to Mansfeld’s and Brunswick’s 
predatory raids from Lower Saxony and East Frisia, and an independent Catholic 
League corps of 12,000 men under Count Anholt had to be permanently maintained in 
that remote corner of the Empire from 1621 onwards.122 The militarily weak Electorate 
of Mainz was another Achilles’ heel in the Imperial war effort. While the Prince-Bishop 
of Cologne could rely on the assistance of Anholt’s Westphalian corps, and the Elector 
of Trier basked under the warm friendship of France, the responsibility for defending 
the ecclesiastical Electorate of Mainz fell to the Emperor, who in his turn was forced to 
call in help from Spain and Bavaria.  
Then there were also individual German princes, who from time to time had to be 
saved from Mansfeld and his confederates. One such individual was Landgrave Ludwig 
V of Hesse-Darmstadt, whose principality Mansfeld invaded in the summer of 1622, 
thus forcing Tilly and Anholt to divert their armies and come to the embattled 
Landgrave’s aid.123 At the same time Christian of Brunswick suddenly emerged from 
Westphalia to threaten Mainz. This new threat forced both Anholt and Tilly to change 
their direction and head towards Mainz, in order to prevent Brunswick’s and Mansfeld’s 
anticipated conjunction. Luckily for Tilly and Anholt, this change of plans allowed 
them to meet Brunswick together at Höchst, and score yet another major victory over 
the Protestant paladins. Ludwig V, on the other hand, was not favoured by the sudden 
turn of events, as his principality succumbed to Mansfeld’s pillaging troops, and the 
Landgrave himself had to endure the ignominy of becoming Mansfeld’s personal 
prisoner.124  
Thirdly, unlike the freebooter Mansfeld, the Emperor and his subordinates were 
responsible for upholding law and order within their dominions. Therefore the Emperor 
had to take seriously any demands from the Imperial Estates for vigilant law 
enforcement. Among the German Estates the Imperial Free Cities were more directly 
affected by the breakdown of law and order than any others. For instance, in 1622 the 
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magistrates of Frankfurt am Main asked Duke Maximilian and Tilly “to keepe the ways 
cleere, of all Robbers and Theeues; That the Merchants might haue free accesse to come and 
trade there, it being not only beneficiall and necessary for the Germane nation and the Empire, 
but likewise for the Elector and diuers States of this Empire.”125 Whether Duke Maximilian 
ever reacted to this particular petition remains unclear.  
One last reason for the Emperor’s discretion in Germany was tax revenue, in 
particular the military taxes granted to the Emperor by the Reichstag and the Circle 
assemblies. However, as the methods of war finance were perhaps the single most 
decisive source of asymmetry between Mansfeld and the Viennese court, their 
investigation deserves to become the topic of another chapter.  
 
In the Palatinate, Baden-Durlach, and the Lower Saxon principalities it was the Emperor 
who was free to act without restrain. Baden-Durlach was spared the miseries of war by 
Margrave Georg Friedrich’s timely abdication after his defeat at Wimpfen, but the 
Palatine cities were less fortunate. The fate of Gemersheim shall suffice as a woeful 
example. That city was besieged by the Archduke Leopold, who first had the city 
indiscriminately battered by eight large siege cannons, after which Gemersheim was 
taken by storm and thoroughly pillaged by the Archduke’s Croatian troops.126 The same 
spectacle was more or less repeated in all the other Palatine cities, Heidelberg, 
Frankendale, and Mannheim. 
Scharzwald, whose inhabitants had resorted to popular uprising and guerrilla 
warfare, fared worst in the hands of the Imperialists. Angered by the contributions and 
levies imposed on them by the occupying Catholic League troops, the Scharzwalders 
rose up in rebellion in 1625, and conducted a long and bloody guerrilla campaign 
against Tilly. Rebellion and dissent were punishable acts by themselves, as the common 
people had neither ius ad bellum nor the right to resist the Imperial administration, but 
what made the events in Schwarzwald even more appalling to Tilly, was the cruel and 
vindictive nature of the local insurgency. In his letter to Duke Frederick Ulrich of 
Brunswick, Tilly vividly described the atrocities committed by the Schwarzwalder 
Harzskytterne, or ‘bushwhackers’: 
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The peasants burn and skin the soldiers’ wives and children, maliciously mutilate ears, 
noses, hands and feet with axes, yes, even the necks and heads of soldiers and distinguished 
officers, skin them alive, tear away their skin in strips and leave them to lay half-dead by the 
roadside.127 
 
Tilly responded to such unconventional methods with cruelties of his own, namely by 
hanging all the captured guerrillas and burning down local villages. 
 
4. METHODS OF WAR FINANCE AND SUPPLY 
 
4.1 The Habsburgs and Their Sources of War Finance 
 
The one crucial source of asymmetry between the Habsburgs and freebooters like 
Mansfeld was the way in which they raised and financed their respective armies. The 
Habsburgs, on one hand, represented law and state authority, while Mansfeld, on the 
other, was a private military entrepreneur and a social outcast, who only embodied 
banditry and disorder. The two differing positions offered their beholders both 
significant advantages and serious defects. In order to make comparative studies 
between the two positions, we must now turn our attention to the economic conditions 
and political structures under which the two belligerents operated in the 1620s.  
The Erbländer of Emperor Ferdinand II consisted of his own family holdings in 
Styria, Carniola, Tyrol, and Carinthia. These were the fiefdoms which Ferdinand II had 
inherited from his father the Archduke Charles of Styria, the second son of Emperor 
Ferdinand I. Added to these were the lands which fell into Ferdinand’s possession after 
the death of Emperor Matthias: Upper and Lower Austria and the Bohemian Kingdom. 
The latter realm was itself a composite state of four separate territories: Bohemia 
proper, Silesia, Moravia, and Lusatia. The Habsburg Emperors also held the Crown of 
St Stephen, which had brought into their possession the northernmost part of Hungary, 
while the rest of that once mighty realm had fallen into the hands of the Ottoman Turks. 
 The power of the Habsburgs in their Erbländer had traditionally been limited. The 
limits had been imposed by the local Estates, which were particularly powerful in the 
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Bohemian Kingdom and Royal Hungary. Aside from the religious privileges, which lay 
at the root of the conflict between the Habsburgs and their Protestant subjects, the local 
Estates had also enjoyed the right to vote on all taxation. Outside the Erbländer, the 
Habsburg Emperors were obliged to summon the Reichstag to vote on military 
subsidies. The grants voted by the Imperial Estates could be substantial, but by 
gathering the German princes together the Emperors would also risk invoking all sorts 
of constitutional and confessional controversies.  
The overwhelming majority of taxation was spent on defending the Empire against 
the Turks. This Türkenhilfe was not used only to pay the soldiers, but also to maintain 
fortresses and river flotillas along the Austro-Turkish Military Border.128 Therefore it 
was preferable for the Habsburgs to make the local Austrian and Hungarian Estates pay 
for the upkeep of their own border defences along the Military Border. By 1618 the 
Military Border in Hungary was manned and supported by the local nobility alone, save 
for the few Austrian garrisons, which were at least partly paid by Vienna, but which had 
otherwise fallen under the military jurisdiction of the local aristocracy.129 This state of 
affairs had satisfied Emperors Rudolf II and Matthias, who had no desire to subject 
themselves to the complaints and bickering of the tumultuous German princes for the 
sake of Türkenhilfe alone. 
A rudimentary bureaucracy had been put in place by the Habsburgs to collect and 
distribute those monies that had been granted by the Patrimonial and Imperial Estates. 
The highest military authority in Austria was the Hofkriegsrat, which directed military 
operations from the Viennese Court. The revenues used for warfare were circulated 
through the coffins of the Court Chamber.130 However, the size of this fiscal-military 
bureaucracy remained modest: Rudolf II only managed to maintain permanently three 
regiments, which were used to garrison key fortresses, and the Court Chamber too 
remained incapable of supporting a larger force in the Erbländer.131 
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4.2 The Crisis of the Habsburg War Finance 
 
The system presented above proved wholly inadequate to the needs of the Habsburgs in 
the face of the Bohemian Rebellion in 1618. The Hungarians, who proceeded to elect 
Bethlen Gabor as their new sovereign in 1619, had joined the rebellious Estates in 
Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia. The Estates in Upper Austria openly collaborated with 
the rebels, while the other Austrian Estates hovered between thinly disguised hostility 
and haughty neutrality. Only the Tyrolean and Styrian Estates backed their native 
sovereign, but the poverty of these under-populated and barren Alpine provinces meant 
that their support could not be realized into effective military resources. 
 From military point of view the Bohemian Rebellion was not a religious or 
ideological struggle, but a conflict between the ruler and the elites. When the elites, 
whose responsibility and privilege the recruitment and management of military forces 
had been, withheld their support from the Emperor and in fact turned their military 
assets against him, the Emperor was forced to seek military assistance elsewhere.132 One 
contributor to the Austrian military effort during the Bohemian Rebellion was Spain, 
which paid subsidies and organized loans to help the fellow Habsburgs in Vienna. The 
Duke of Lerma, the acting first minister until 1621, was originally reluctant to subsidize 
the Emperor, because Lerma and his fellow ‘doves’ feared that by helping Ferdinand II 
they might unnecessarily prolong the war. Lerma was however overruled by the militant 
court party led by Balthasar de Zúñiga, the Spanish envoy at Prague, and in July 1619 
Madrid paid Vienna 3.4 million thalers in war subsidies.133 The Spanish help was not 
limited to money only, and in May 1619 7,000 Spanish soldiers arrived from Flanders 
to help the embattled Emperor; by March 1621 the Spanish had committed 40,000 
troops to the Austrian Habsburgs’ aid.134 
 The most instrumental support arrived from Munich. Duke Maximilian had placed 
the entire Catholic League at the Emperor’s disposal, but not out of sheer charity or 
undemanding Catholic solidarity. Bavaria was a rich Duchy, and Maximilian a rich 
prince; this meant that the running costs of the Catholic League army could be met by 
Bavaria and the three Catholic Electors, while the Emperor was left to foot the final bill. 
The arrangement between Duke Maximilian and Ferdinand II was based on pledges, not 
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cash. The Emperor was to concede to Bavaria all the conquest the Catholic League had 
made against the Palatinate, in addition to which the Emperor was forced to transfer 
Upper Austria to Duke Maximilian as a pledge against all outstanding arrears. Duke 
Maximilian, who was fully aware of the Emperor’s financial difficulties, expected to be 
rewarded with Frederick’s electoral title as well, in the likely event that the Emperor 
would be forced to default on his debts. 
 As the war escalated and new enemies entered the fray, even Bavarian finances 
began to wear thin. Therefore, from roughly 1621 onwards, the Emperor began to rely 
more and more on Imperial Contributions as sources of military revenue. These official 
Kontributionen should not be confused with the forced ransoms levied by the likes of 
Mansfeld, Brunswick, and other professional pillagers. The economic historian Fritz 
Redlich went to great pains in order to highlight the differences between the official 
Kontributionen of the former kind and the extortionist ‘contributions’ of the latter. The 
former source of revenue, much preferred by the Imperialists during the period under 
our investigation, originated from a regular tax raised by, and with the consent of, the 
Estates of the realm.135 It was, in effect, a revised form of Türkenhilfe. The Emperor’s 
correspondence refers to many instances of such voluntary Kontributionen being levied 
from the German bishops in the early 1620s.136  
The Emperor, however, became more and more inclined to simply demand 
Kontributionen rather than to plead for them. Thus in September 1621 we read him 
bluntly ordering the Swabian and Franconian cities to deliver him fifty months worth of 
Reichskontributionen in a single instalment of 320,000 florins.137 The 
Reichskontributionen were not yet exacted at the sword’s edge, but the Emperor was 
clearly getting impatient with the Estates and their time-consuming consensual 
procedures. That very same year the Emperor extended the monthly Kontributionen to 
the three Estates of the subjugated Upper Austria;138 due process there was, we might 
imagine, greatly facilitated by the fact that the Austrian Estates were by then composed 
entirely of the Emperor’s loyal servants. A more forceful contribution was imposed by 
Marquis Spinola on the occupied Lower Palatinate. As that princedom had effectively 
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become one large Spanish garrison, Spinola felt justified in ordering the subjugated 
Palatines to contribute to the Spanish military expenses. Spinola saw no need to seek the 
consent of the local Estates, and the contributions were imposed under the pretext of 
martial law. Because Spinola bypassed the local Estates and their subordinate 
magistrates in the matter, he was forced to set up his own agencies to collect the dues 
and distribute the receipts.139 Therefore, already in the 1620s, we can see the Habsburgs 
gradually moving away from the old system of collecting contributions by general 
consent, and towards the less negotiable settlements imposed by rapacious military 
entrepreneurs such as Mansfeld or Brunswick. 
 
4.3 Mansfeld and His Methods of War Finance in Bohemia 
 
Mansfeld’s methods of supplying his troops differed very much from those of the 
Habsburgs. The roots of Mansfeld’s supply mechanism were in the institutionalised 
robbery of fifteenth- and sixteenth-century German Landsknechter. These mercenary 
knights had levied forced imposts known as Brandschatzen. The Brandschatzung was 
effectively a ransom in money or kind, levied against a promise not to loot and burn 
enemy property.140 Akin to Brandschatzung was another form of payment, the 
Ritterzehrung, which was originally a form of alms given to poor knight-errants.141 
Over the course of sixteenth century, the Ritterzehrung too had developed into a form of 
mild extortion, as it was often being demanded from friendly towns by armies on the 
march. In principle the Ritterzehrung remained a voluntary payment, but in practice it 
was being paid to avoid damages – much like the Brandschatzung.142 
 Mansfeld did not start his military career in the Bohemian service as an extortionist 
and a plunderer. After he had conquered Pilsen, the town was placed under the authority 
of magistrates loyal to the Bohemian Directory, and later, under the pretender Frederick 
V. Mansfeld’s role was initially limited to that of a commander of the town’s garrison. 
As the Bohemian military situation deteriorated in 1619, Mansfeld sent request after 
request to Prague, asking the land officers to use their authority and command the 
townspeople of Pilsen and the surrounding country peasants to form work gangs to 
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repair the town’s defences.143 What is interesting in Mansfeld’s letters to the Prague 
government is the fact that they were sent from Pilsen itself; Mansfeld clearly felt that 
he lacked the necessary authority to command the local population to do his bidding, 
and felt obliged to respect the official chains of command. When the officials in Prague 
failed to induce the Pilseners to commit themselves full-heartedly in common military 
effort, the tone of Mansfeld’s letters began to change. According to the Appollogie of 
Mansfield,  
 
hee propounded a course which is much practised, and common in other Nations, and easily 
to be put in vse among them, which was a Contribution to be raised vpon the Countrey 
Pesants, offering to make an account of that which he should gather, and to deduct it out of 
his, and his Souldiers pay.144 
 
Mansfeld effectively suggested that the rebel government should skip due process, and 
simply take the required contributions by force, without consulting the local Estates at 
all. When the war was won and over, the local population would be compensated for 
their sacrifices. The Bohemian rebels, who had taken up arms against the Habsburgs in 
order to defend the rights of the local Estates to decide on matters of religion and 
finance, naturally turned down such an unscrupulous scheme, with turned stomachs and 
shocked faces one might imagine. 
 The land officers, however, were in Prague, and Mansfeld, together with his 
increasingly discontent mercenaries, was in situ in Pilsen. It should come to us as no 
surprise then, that while the appalled officials in Prague were reading Mansfeld’s 
callous words, the mercenaries in Pilsen were already helping themselves with money 
and victuals from the hapless local population. For the remainder of the Bohemian war, 
Pilsen was a hostage to Mansfeld and his soldiers. Squatting in Pilsen naturally failed to 
satisfy Mansfeld’s ambitions, and he became anxious to find some notable action that 
would “make enuie itselfe blush for shame.”145 In June 1619 he set out on campaign to 
reduce the remaining Imperialist strongholds in Bohemia, namely Krummau, Budweiss, 
and the Castle Thein. The results were disappointing, thanks to the pitiful condition of 
Mansfeld’s army, which still lacked the necessary monies and victuals to carry out long 
and burdensome siege operations. Mansfeld was forced to borrow money at his own 
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account to pay for his troops’ expenses, because the treasury in Prague still claimed it 
did not have the necessary means to provide for Mansfeld’s army. Disgusted at the 
treasury’s vacillation, Mansfeld himself travelled to Prague “to finde the means, to 
minister some comfort vnto his Armie.”146  
While Mansfeld was in Prague, the rebel Estates in Upper Austria discharged a 
regiment of soldiers formerly employed by Mansfeld. The discontented and seditious 
soldiers made their way to Prague to demand their arrears from Mansfeld himself. At 
first Mansfeld made some attempts to satisfy the soldiers’ avarice, by reimbursing them 
with two or three months’ worth of pay. After a few days, however, Mansfeld was at his 
wit’s end, on account of the Austrian Estates having failed to send him any money to 
pay for the soldiers. Mutinous soldiers were not satisfied with Mansfeld’s excuses, and 
the unhappy situation escalated to the point where fifty drunken mercenaries assaulted 
Mansfeld’s personal quarters and threatened to keep him there as their hostage until the 
arrears were settled. Alarmed by the sudden commotion, Mansfeld’s officers rushed to 
their master’s help: swords were drawn, shots fired, blood spilled, and lives taken. 
Finally the Winter King sent his personal guard to aid Mansfeld, and even the Prague 
burghers promised their protection to him.147 Sedition was quelled by the authorities’ 
public support of Mansfeld, but the morale of the army had already been damaged 
beyond repair. Mansfeld realized that no amount of disciplinary action or court-
martialling would keep the mercenaries from rising against a military entrepreneur who 
failed to deliver money and loot to his work force; only prey would satisfy the dogs of 
war. 
Disagreement over arrears finally induced Mansfeld to part ways with the 
Winter King and to establish himself as an independent military entrepreneur at Pilsen. 
Already in the early winter of 1621, right after the disaster at the White Mountain, 
Mansfeld was conducting small-scale cavalry forays north of Pilsen, collecting forced 
contributions from the frightened population and ransacking wealthy abbeys.148 The 
abbey of Töpl fared the worst: a once mighty convent with an opulent sacristy and a 
voluminous library was sacked by the Mansfelders, after which the convent’s walls 
were torn down.149  
 
                                               
146 Ibid., p. 32 
147 Ibid., pp. 33-35 
148 Villermont, Mansfeldt, I, p. 278 
149 Ibid., p. 279 
 45
4.4 Contributions and Pillage 
 
From 1621 onwards Mansfeld’s supply mechanism consisted of a variation of 
Brandschatzung, Ritterzehrung, and outright pillage. Nominally friendly or neutral 
communities were usually subjected to the Ritterzehrung. The communities were 
therefore expected to deliver contributions voluntarily, even though the threat of 
violence seems to have been implicated in Mansfeld’s requests. Examples of 
Ritterzehrung can be found from the Württemberg territory in 1621, when the cities of 
Wimpfen and Heilbronn paid Mansfeld gutwillige Ritterzehrung worth of 12,000 and 
20,000 florins respectively.150 Nuremberg, however, seems to have paid bribes to 
Mansfeld personally, in order to ensure that the General would check the licentiousness 
of his troops in the city’s proximity.151 Because German cities typically consisted of a 
religiously mixed population, Mansfeld generally demanded more tribute from 
Catholics and Jews than from the Protestant inhabitants. While wasting the 
Landgraviate of Hesse-Darmstadt in June 1622, Mansfeld demanded 150,000 thalers 
from the Jewish residents of Frankfurt am Main, an Imperial City that pursued a strictly 
neutral policy. In order to avoid any unpleasantries, the Jews of Frankfurt agreed to pay 
Mansfeld 12,000 thalers.152 Mansfeld could also take stern measures to induce urban 
dwellers to comply with his demands. Hence the Strasbourg diarist Johann Walter 
observed in 1621: “The Mansfelder soldiers have demanded 120,000 ducats from Haguenau. 
As a security they have taken several rich Burghers and Jews as hostages.”153  
While invoking his right for Ritterzehrung, Mansfeld made little effort to safeguard 
the sensitivities of neutral parties or alleged allies. As an imperial outlaw and a non-
state operator, it was implied in Mansfeld’s very existence that laws did not bind him, 
and that he could consequently resort to brute force in order to get his own way. 
Mansfeld certainly did not care much about his reputation in the eyes of international 
financers either, because credit was not a major source of revenue for him. Creditors 
typically supported Mansfeld’s foreign employers, and not himself directly. One such 
creditor was the Italian Protestant Philip Burlamachi, who loaned money to James I, 
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who in his turn forwarded them to Mansfeld as military subsidies.154 The only occasion 
when Mansfeld did receive direct credit was in 1621, when Strasbourg merchants 
advanced him money on the monthly subsidies paid by the Dutch States General.155 
Otherwise Mansfeld made no difference between contributions and credit. In the winter 
of 1621-1622 Mansfeld loaned 30,000 thalers from the burghers of Haguenau, and an 
additional sum from the town’s Jewish residents. None of these loans were ever paid 
back, which effectively made them forced contributions.156 
Examples of extortion and pillage carried out by the Mansfelders are a legion, and 
there really is neither need nor available space to catalogue them in full. Two specific 
aspects of Mansfeld’s conduct do however deserve to be singled out. Firstly, Mansfeld 
had no qualms about turning neutral or potentially neutral territories into war zones. 
East Frisia is perhaps the best example of Mansfeld’s callousness. That territory was 
within the Dutch sphere of influence, and the alignment of its population towards the 
war in Germany was as yet undecided when Mansfeld entered the County. Soon 
Mansfeld’s excesses drove the largely Protestant Frisians into open rebellion against 
Mansfeld and his Dutch paymasters. Another similar example is provided by 
Mansfeld’s campaign into the Erbländer in 1626. Bohemia, Silesia, and Moravia were 
potential breeding-grounds for anti-Habsburg sentiments. However, instead of fanning 
the flames of dissent among the Emperor’s Bohemian subjects, Mansfeld went out of 
his way to alienate them further from the Palatine cause by his wanton pillage and 
murder.  
The second characteristic feature in Mansfeld’s pillage was its anti-clerical nature. 
The unfortunate monastery of Töpl was only one of many abbeys to be ransacked by 
Mansfeld’s troops. Whereas attacks against Catholic churches by Mansfeld’s cohort 
Christian of Brunswick may have been expressions of the Mad Halberstadter’s personal 
animosities, Mansfeld’s own raids into ecclesiastical territory were more likely 
motivated by loot rather than religious sentiments. Catholic churches, monasteries, and 
abbeys were well-stocked with money, art, books, and silverware, in part due to the 
visually elaborate nature of the traditional sacraments and processions, in part as a result 
of the new baroque fashion, which called for opulence and artistic overkill in Catholic 
churches and ceremonies. Because the Catholic Church was also a major landowner in 
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the Rhinelandish Pfaffengasse, abbeys and monasteries operated partly as logistical 
centres, where the tithe-paying commoners, often forced to pay their dues in kind rather 
than cash, delivered grain and livestock. Lastly, because monasteries in particular 
engaged in viticulture, the wine cellars of abbeys and convents were usually filled with 
precious vintage. Indeed, in the summer of 1622 Mansfeld collected 5,000 bushels of 
corn and 500 cartloads of wine from the clerics of Speyer alone.157 Mansfeld himself, 
however, was not interested in collecting contributions in kind. Thus, according to an 
English pamphlet from 1622, “he giveth the ordinarie spoyle to his souldiers, and hee taketh 
most of the coyne to himselfe.”158 The reason for such conduct was that prospective 
recruits could not be lured into the army’s ranks with any commodity other than cash. 
Unchecked licentiousness created a major asymmetry between Mansfeld and the 
Emperor. The latter had to think twice before demanding billeting and contributions 
from the German Estates, lest he drive neutral Protestants into the arms of the rebels or 
alienate friendly Catholics from a common war effort. The Imperialists had admittedly 
engaged in looting, murder, and other excessive behaviour during the Bohemian 
Rebellion, but after the war spread into Germany, the Emperor and his allies had to 
tread carefully in order to honour constitutional traditions, the Imperial 
Wahlkapitulationen, and the precious ‘German Liberties’. Mansfeld had no such 
constitutional or political scruples, and could therefore squeeze contributions from 
anyone unfortunate enough to find himself in his path.  
Mansfeld’s unlimited warfare against religious institutions was one particularly 
striking source of asymmetry between the combatants. The Emperor had to appear as 
the guarantor of the Religious Peace of 1555; consequently he could not act against the 
Lutherans without attacking the very foundations of social order in the Empire. He 
could, and indeed did, oppress the Calvinists, who were excluded from the Peace of 
Augsburg, but robbing their churches brought no rich dividends. Whereas Mansfeld’s 
favourite prey, the Catholic abbeys and monasteries, were filled ceiling-high with 
treasures of all sorts, the austere Calvinist temples contained nothing but the most 
rudimentary (and often unbearably uncomfortable) furniture. 
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4.5 Mansfeld as a Military Entrepreneur 
 
Perhaps the most significant asymmetry between the Emperor and Mansfeld was the 
fact that the former was a warlord and the latter a military entrepreneur. The warlord 
was a purely political leader, who had no direct access to military means. In order to 
wage war, the warlord had to rely on the military entrepreneur, who raised the necessary 
forces and led them to battle. Nowhere does the difference between the two appear more 
conspicuous than in the act of recruitment. No seventeenth-century German warlord had 
either the ability or the means to raise forces by himself. The foremost reason for this 
was that, unlike the military entrepreneurs, the German princes had no access to credit. 
This sad state of affairs was well illuminated by the Saxon Duke’s unsuccessful 
attempts in 1619 and 1620 to raise funds in Leipzig.159 The same difficulties were faced 
by the Emperor, whose finances rested on the willingness of the Estates to support him. 
Added to the lack of credit was the warlords’ inexperience in recruiting soldiers. In the 
Habsburg Erbländer the recruitment and maintenance of armed forces had traditionally 
been the responsibility of the local Estates, and the Emperors had not been expected to 
bother themselves with such mundane matters. 
 What enabled the military entrepreneur to rise to a dominant position was the nature 
of warfare in the early seventeenth century, when armies were raised at the beginning of 
the campaign season in spring and dissolved before the winter. This state of affairs 
required the existence of such individuals, who could be there when the snows melted, 
with cash at hand and ready to be offered to potential recruits. The Handgeld paid at the 
beginning of employment was a major incentive for any would-be mercenaries, because 
Handgeld was invariably paid in that most coveted item of the age, hard cash.160 The 
reckless, wasteful, and profligate princes, incurably impoverished and unremittingly 
short of cash, could not meet this demand, and therefore it was left to the military 
entrepreneurs to raise troops at their own expense. 
 Raising armies was perhaps Mansfeld’s greatest attribute as a military commander. 
Time and again his armies evaporated or melted away: in 1620 in the aftermath of the 
Bohemian Rebellion, in 1623 in East Frisia, in 1625 in Lower Saxony, and in 1626 after 
the defeat at Dessau. Yet every time Mansfeld came back with another army, sometimes 
even in increased strength. At the beginning of 1621, Mansfeld’s military strength was 
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approximately 5,600 infantry and 3,600 cavalry.161 By the end of the summer 
Mansfeld’s army had reached an effective strength of 18,000 men.162 In six months 
Mansfeld had managed to double his troop strength. At the peak of his strength in mid-
1622 Mansfeld commanded some 50,000 men.163 These numbers soon diminished, and 
in late 1622 Mansfeld entered East Frisia with 12,000 infantry and 7,000 cavalry.164 
After encumbering the land with his unwelcome presence for one full year, Mansfeld 
finally dissolved his entire army. However, in early 1625, Mansfeld landed on the North 
Sea coast with yet another army of 13,000 men. This army too wasted away thanks to 
poor supply, desertion, and disease, and by the time Mansfeld reached the Lower Saxon 
Circle in the autumn, his ragged army had been reduced to 4,000 infantry and 500-900 
cavalry.165 Mansfeld again built a new army on the ruins of the old. In collusion with 
the Danish commander Fuchs von Bimbach, Mansfeld mustered a force of 18,000 men 
for the renewed campaign of 1626.166 When this force was annihilated by Wallenstein at 
Dessau, Mansfeld came back with a final army of 16,000 men, which he had managed 
to recruit in less than two months.167 Mansfeld’s last army melted away in Hungary and 
the Balkans. Mansfeld maintained his characteristic belief in his ability to raise new 
armies, and was apparently planning to raise new troops for Venetian service when 
death finally put a stop to his warlike endeavours. 
 How did Mansfeld accomplish such feats of recruitment? Once again, Mansfeld’s 
role as a non-state operator and an asymmetrical opponent to the Habsburgs comes forth 
in the historical inquiry. First of all, Mansfeld appealed to a large segment of potential 
recruits. The Austrian and Spanish Habsburgs had many enemies, and representatives of 
nations, princedoms, estates, and creeds hostile to the Habsburg cause flocked under the 
banners of Europe’s foremost opponent to Habsburg rule. By the summer of 1621 
Mansfeld’s army consisted of ‘old’ regiments of German, Savoyard, and Bohemian 
troops, plus ‘new’ Saxe-Weimarian, Brandenburger, Grison, and Anglo-Scottish 
regiments.168 The following year in Alsace, Mansfeld increased the size of his army to 
43,000 men, mainly by recruiting among French Huguenots and Swiss Protestants.169 
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When the Duke of Lorraine that very same year rather foolishly sacked 2,500 of his 
mercenaries, the vagrant soldiers soon entered Mansfeld’s service.170 Later in the war 
Mansfeld also recruited contingents of English, Dutch, and Danish troops. In the final 
days of his military career Mansfeld even had the audacity to assume the command of 
the Janissaries sent to his aid by the Pasha of Buda.171 
 The second reason why mercenaries of various nationalities and creeds flocked to 
Mansfeld’s standard was the lure of pay and booty. Mansfeld had quickly developed a 
reputation as a generous paymaster, who paid higher Handgeld and monthly wages than 
any other contemporaneous military entrepreneur.172 Such generosity was, however, 
deceptive. Even though Mansfeld paid generous Handgeld to fresh recruits, his soldiers 
soon found themselves lagging behind in scheduled monthly wages. The end result was 
the accumulation of pay arrears, which deficiency plagued Mansfeld and his military 
enterprise to the very end. What allowed Mansfeld to alleviate the discontent caused by 
the non-payment of monthly wages was the prospect of loot and the distribution of 
contributions among his men. The attraction of booty should not be underestimated. 
Whereas military entrepreneurs like Mansfeld were motivated by the prospect of social 
ascendancy rather than loot, the common mercenaries were drawn to those commanders 
who could line their soldiers’ pockets with silver and gold.  
In this sense the Imperialists were no better than Mansfeld and his mercenary horde: 
the Imperial Croats allegedly flew a standard, which depicted a wolf and the inscription: 
“Ich dürste nach Beute.”173 The only distinguishable difference was that the Imperialists 
sought to regulate looting. The Imperial regulations were based on the articles of war 
issued by Ferdinand I in 1527, which forbade plundering without the authorization and 
knowledge of the commanding colonel. There was to be a time and place for 
plundering, usually in the aftermath of a successful siege, and no individual soldier was 
allowed to leave camp and forage on his own.174 Mansfeld, on the other hand, placed 
little restrictions on his men, and he himself was the first one to admit that his troops 
operated without any recourse to the established norms of warfare. 
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5. INDIRECT WARFARE 
 
5.1 Indirect Warfare in Early-Modern Europe 
 
Indirect or diversionary war is a form of asymmetrical warfare, in which war is being 
fought through third powers or proxies, usually in secrecy, so as to avoid risking direct 
involvement in the conflict. Recent examples of indirect wars include the Korean War, 
the Vietnam War, and the Soviet war in Afghanistan. 
The concept of indirect war was familiar to the seventeenth-century Europeans. The 
incessant religious and dynastic strife of the late sixteenth century had given European 
nations ample opportunities for waging indirect or clandestine wars against each other. 
England had permitted the Sea Beggars to operate from English ports during the Dutch 
Rebellion, the Dutch and the English had helped to maintain the Huguenot cause in 
France, the Spanish in their turn had fomented rebellion in Ireland and encouraged the 
ultra-Catholic Guise faction to exterminate the Huguenot leadership in France, while 
Venice, Tuscany, and the Papal State had incited France to take up arms against 
Spain.175  
The same Machiavellian pursuit of secret wars persisted into the early seventeenth 
century. The Spanish in particular had excelled in this tournament of shadows, mainly 
by employing mercenaries, pirates, and other non-state actors against their rivals. 
Therefore in the early seventeenth century the Republic of Venice came under attack 
from Uskoks and other pirates, who drew encouragement and support from the Spanish 
viceroy in Naples. Indeed, the whole Italian peninsula had become one massive 
battlefield in an early modern ‘cold war’, in which France, Spain, and Venice fought 
each other through local proxy powers such as Savoy, Mantua, and the Grey Leagues. 
Similar scenarios appeared elsewhere in Europe as well. In western Europe the new 
French King Henry IV subsidized the Dutch, who were still fighting against the 
Spanish. The Ottoman Turks secretly continued their struggle against the Habsburgs 
even after the Peace of Zsitva Török, by encouraging the warlike ambitions of the 
Transylvanian Prince Bethlen Gabor. Even in the far north a strange game of thrones 
was being played out by Sweden and Poland-Lithuania, who both supported their own 
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proxies during the Time of Troubles, when rival factions and false Tsars contested the 
royal power in Russia.176 
Mansfeld first experienced the ways of indirect war during his early days in 
Habsburg and Protestant Union service. The Jülich-Cleves War of Succession, in which 
Mansfeld had initially participated on the Habsburg side, was a classic example of 
indirect warfare by third powers. The original dispute had touched the Houses of 
Brandenburg and Neuburg, who squabbled over the right of succession to the deceased 
Duke of Jülich-Cleves. Rudolf II, apparently acting on the instigation of his brother 
Albrecht, the Spanish viceroy of Flanders who feared that the strategically important 
Duchy might fall into the hands of Dutch sympathizers (both the rulers of Brandenburg 
and Neuburg were at the time Lutherans), ordered Mansfeld’s employer Leopold of 
Passau to move into Jülich-Cleves with troops, and to sequester the contested Duchy in 
the Emperor’s name. The two rival Houses united in their opposition against the 
Emperor, and sought support from the States General and Henry IV of France, who 
were anxious to keep Jülich-Cleves from falling into the hands of the Spanish. Henry IV 
went so far as to plan a direct military intervention in Jülich-Cleves, but the King’s 
death at the hands of an assassin prevented the crisis from escalating into a full-blown 
war between France and the Habsburgs. Added to the external hegemonic rivalry 
between France, the United Provinces, and Spain, was the internal struggle within the 
Empire between the Protestant Union and the Catholic League. Duke John Sigismund of 
Brandenburg courted the favour of the Protestant Union by converting to Calvinism, 
while his Neuburg rival Duke Wolfgang William approached the Catholic League, 
converted to Catholicism, and married the sister of Duke Maximilian. A cessation of 
hostilities took place in 1614 with the Treaty of Xanten, but it took another 37 years 
before Brandenburg and Neuburg finally settled the dispute.177  
 
5.2 Mansfeld and Savoy 
 
Mansfeld first became an agent of diversionary warfare in 1615, when the Protestant 
Union transferred him to Savoyard service. The decision to send Mansfeld to Savoy was 
part and parcel of the Protestant Union’s anti-Habsburg policy. In his letter to Duke 
Charles Emmanuel of Savoy, Margrave Joachim Ernest of Ansbach-Bayreuth, one of 
                                               
176 Geoffrey Parker, Europe in Crisis 1598-1648 (London: Fontana, 1979) 
177 Parker, Thirty Years’ War, pp. 23-33 
 53
the leaders of the Protestant Union, promised Union assistance in raising a mercenary 
contingent under Mansfeld’s command, on the condition that the troops would be used 
to attack the Spanish in Milan.178 
After the conclusion of peace between Spain and Savoy in 1617, it was Duke 
Charles Emmanuel’s turn to employ Mansfeld as an agent of indirect war. After the 
cessation of hostilities against Spain, Charles Emmanuel had no further need for a 
troublesome adventurer like Mansfeld, whose troops, according to the Acta 
Mansfeldica, were seriously discomforting the Savoyard peasantry.179 The Duke 
informed the resident Venetian ambassador Ranier Zen that Savoy could not pay 
Mansfeld’s troops, and to keep the mercenaries in service would be a violation of the 
peace treaty with the Spanish. He then went on to lament that “it would be a pity” if 
Mansfeld’s troops were to be disbanded, and offered the troops to Venice.180 The 
Venetians, who already had trouble with their own seditious mercenaries, declined the 
offer. The timely outbreak of the Bohemian Rebellion proved to be the only way to rid 
Savoy of its military burden. 
Sending Mansfeld to Bohemia was not only an opportune way to get rid of a military 
entrepreneur who was becoming something of a nuisance, but also an opportunity to 
improve the standing of the Casa Savoia in the hierarchy of European princedoms. 
Duke Charles Emmanuel was, according to a wide historical consensus, a ‘chameleon-
like’ political opportunist with broad territorial and international ambitions.181 While 
sending Mansfeld off to Bohemia in 1618 was a mere matter of convenience to Charles 
Emmanuel, the decision to further subsidize Mansfeld was motivated by dynastic 
ambition. The Venetian diplomatic reports suggest that Charles Emmanuel was initially 
reluctant “to take advantage of the disturbances in Bohemia and [to] retain troops for that 
purpose.”182 Ambition soon replaced caution, and in September 1618 we discover 
Charles Emmanuel secretly subsidizing Mansfeld’s operations in Bohemia with 20,000 
ducats.183 Ranier Zen’s reports from Turin reveal the reason behind Charles 
Emmanuel’s change of mind: the Duke believed that the uneasy dynastic alliance 
between France and Spain had come to its end, and that the marriages between Louis 
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XIII and Anne of Austria on one hand, and Philip IV and Isabella Bourbon on the other, 
were about to be dissolved. Such a breach of relations could only lead to an open war 
between Spain and France, Charles Emmanuel believed, and went on to insist that the 
time had come “to smash the House of Austria.”184 
For Charles Emmanuel, Mansfeld’s continued presence in Bohemia was clearly a 
method of fighting the Habsburgs indirectly. However, it was also a way of placing the 
Bohemian Confederates into Savoy’s debt, and by that way allowing the House of 
Savoy to exploit the Bohemian succession crisis, which had occurred after the death of 
Emperor Matthias in March 1619. Matthias’s sudden death meant that both the Imperial 
and Bohemian thrones had become vacant, and in June the Prince of Piedmont admitted 
to the Venetian ambassador in Paris that his father Charles Emmanuel had plans for the 
Imperial throne.185 While the Savoyard Duke was admittedly ambitious, such a design 
was hopelessly beyond the means of an Italian prince who had no influence in the 
Electoral College; the Bohemian throne, however, was much more attainable, as its 
acquisition rested solely on the consent of the rebellious Bohemian Estates, who were 
already deeply indebted to Charles Emmanuel. Baron Dohna, the Palatine envoy at The 
Hague, reported to his English and Venetian colleagues that the Bohemians had indeed 
considered the candidacy of Charles Emmanuel, but that he was deigned “too Italian” for 
their Protestant tastes.186  
When Mansfeld sent word of the election of Frederick V as the new King of 
Bohemia, Charles Emmanuel put on a brave face and appeared to the Venetian 
ambassador pleased of this news.187 Later the ambassador heard rumours that the Duke 
felt betrayed by the English. Count Palatine’s advisor Christian of Anhalt, it seemed, 
had promised Charles Emmanuel either the Imperial throne or that of Bohemia; Charles 
Emmanuel regarded it a failure on behalf of the English that they had not managed to 
force King James’s son-in-law to honour the Palatinate’s commitment to the House of 
Savoy.188 
Soon after the Bohemians had thwarted his dynastic ambitions, Charles Emmanuel 
withdrew his support from Mansfeld. The outcome of the royal elections had been a 
deep personal disappointment, which had been further worsened by the untimely 
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publication of Charles Emmanuel’s correspondence with Mansfeld, to which affair we 
shall return later. After Frederick V lost both his Bohemian kingdom and his Palatine 
electorate, Mansfeld’s itinerant army became the only way for the exiled Palatine court 
to keep its cause alive in Germany. The impoverished Winter King did not, however, 
have the necessary means to finance indirect war in Germany, and for that reason he 
was forced to fall back on the support of outside powers willing to bear the costs of 
Mansfeld’s warfare. Such an arrangement naturally meant that Frederick V had to leave 
higher decision-making to his foreign benefactors. 
 
Because of his affiliation with the Palatine cause, Mansfeld was the obvious 
intermediate for Calvinist powers outside Germany. The Dutch and the French 
Huguenots were, however, more interested in employing Mansfeld in direct rather than 
non-direct warfare. After Friedrich V had dismissed Mansfeld and Brunswick from 
Palatine service in 1622, the Huguenot Duke of Sedan invited the paladins to fight for 
Protestantism in France, where the Royalists were conducting a military campaign 
against traditional the Huguenot strongholds in La Rochelle and Languedoc. The French 
King’s representative, the governor of Champagne Duke Charles de Nevers, was 
equally interested in taking Mansfeld in Royalist service for the simple reason of 
denying the formidable mercenary’s services to the Huguenots. Nevers utilized a 
combination of military posturing and bribes, which finally succeeded in diverting 
Mansfeld away from French soil.189 
The Dutch too were interested in securing Mansfeld’s warlike services for the relief 
of besieged Bergen-op-Zoom. Even though Spinola had already lifted the siege by the 
time Mansfeld arrived in the Netherlands, the States General still sought to retain 
Mansfeld’s services. Mansfeld’s employment in East Frisia as an ‘occupier for contract’ 
fulfilled in many ways the criteria for indirect warfare. East Frisia was a small 
principality situated between the United Provinces and the Duchy of Holstein. Emden, 
the capitol of East Frisia, had been effectively incorporated into the Dutch Republic in 
1602, when the town burghers accepted a Dutch garrison there. From thereon Emden 
had evolved into a radical political and religious centre for Calvinism, and the focus for 
opposition to the ruling Lutheran Cirksena family in East Frisia.190  
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The accession of Count Enno III in 1599 worried the Dutch, because the new Count 
had good relations with Spain and was more determined to impose his authority on his 
subjects than his predecessors.191 In 1622 the Flemish commander Count Hendrik van 
Bergh was conducting a series of operations against the Dutch in Jülich, and it was 
feared in The Hague that the Spaniards might open another front against the Dutch in 
East Frisia with the connivance of Enno III. It was therefore agreed to send Mansfeld to 
East Frisia, where he might guard the Republic’s eastern frontier against any surprise 
attack by the Spanish, and where his troops would create such a heavy burden on the 
local Estates that the ability of Count Enno III to arm the Frisians by himself would be 
seriously diminished.192 Mansfeld’s mistreatment of East Frisia succeeded in reducing 
Enno III to such despair that he was moved to appeal for Swedish intervention 
(Gustavus Adolphus was Enno’s nephew by marriage). Enno’s distress served Gustavus 
Adolphus as an excuse for a planned Protestant alliance, which was in reality aimed 
against the Habsburgs and not Mansfeld.193 
 
5.3 Mansfeld in Anglo-French Service 
 
In 1624 Mansfeld disbanded his army and travelled to England. At that time London 
was a veritable nest of international intrigue. James I and his confident George Villiers, 
the Duke of Buckingham, had weaved a web of dynastic and political relationships that 
extended to almost every royal house in Europe. For years James I had chosen to remain 
aloof from continental affairs, and had wished to appear as an arbiter between the 
belligerent powers. The reason for his careful foreign policy had been the prospect of a 
dynastic alliance between England and Spain, which James I had desired to accomplish 
by marrying his son Charles to the Spanish Infanta Maria.  
In 1623 Charles and his new friend Buckingham carried out a harebrained scheme 
and travelled to Madrid in cognito to woo the Spanish Infanta. The result was an 
unmitigated diplomatic disaster, when Philip IV, baffled by the unexpected appearance 
of such illustrious yet uninvited guests, sent the two suitors packing without the reward 
of a royal marriage. On their return to England embarrassment turned to anger, and the 
Protestant public clamoured for vengeance. Charles, grateful for an opportunity to save 
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his own face, quickly politicised a private debacle, and accused the Spanish of having 
attempted to convert him to Catholicism by force.194 The denied and shamed suitor then 
went on to claim publicly, “that though he had never loved popery, he had not hated it till he 
saw it in the court of Spain.”195 All hope for an alliance with Spain had suddenly 
disappeared: “And this journey hath wrought one unexpected effect, that whereas it was 
thought the Spaniards and we should piece and grow together, it seems we are generally more 
disjointed and further asunder in affections than ever,” the renowned author John 
Chamberlain wrote to his friend Dudley Carleton, the English ambassador at The 
Hague.196 
 When the Parliament convened in February 1624, Puritan MPs made demands for an 
indirect war against Spain on the continental theatre of war.197 All eyes were on 
Mansfeld, who arrived in London the following month. Both the Prince of Wales and 
the Duke of Buckingham showed Mansfeld great courtesy, and Charles offered him 
lodgings at the very rooms that had been furnished for the expected Spanish bride.198 At 
the instigation of the Crown Prince and the indignant Puritans, James I permitted 
Mansfeld to raise troops in England for a planned expedition to reclaim the Palatinate.  
 Even though the Puritans and other Protestant firebrands wished every conceivable 
ill on the Catholic Habsburgs, they hesitated to support direct English involvement in 
the continental war. The reason behind the Parliament’s lack of enthusiasm was not the 
fear of the Habsburgs, but rather the fear of the Stuarts. James I had not been in the 
habit to consult the Parliament on matters of great importance, which practice reeked of 
absolutist ambitions and alienated the King from his Parliament. James I, in his turn, 
regarded foreign policy as an arcanum imperii, and was wont to allow the Parliament 
any hand in such matters.  
In early 1624 James I had agreed to terminate negotiations with Spain on the 
condition that the Parliament gave him its unlimited support for the duration of the 
war.199 This the Parliament was unwilling to do, unless the King would fully commit 
himself to a war against Spain. James I was enough of a realist to understand that an 
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extended war against Spain would not help him achieve his primary foreign policy goal, 
the restoration of the Palatinate.200 Nevertheless, the only way to get subsidies from the 
Parliament was to create the impression that an anti-Spanish expedition was indeed on 
the cards, and for that purpose James I was forced to furnish a fleet. Ultimately, only six 
vessels were commissioned.201 As the King was also forced to subsidize the armaments 
of his brother-in-law Christian IV, outside help was needed to finance Mansfeld’s 
intended expedition to the Palatinate. The banker Burlamachi agreed to loan some of the 
monies, but the rest would have to come from foreign allies, such as the United 
Provinces and France.202 
 
The years 1624-1625 witnessed a brief dalliance between the two royal courts in 
London and Paris. In absence of a Spanish match, the Stuarts consoled themselves with 
a French one. In May 1625, after complex negotiations touching mostly on issues of 
religious toleration, the new King Charles I and the sister of Louis XIII, Henrietta 
Maria, were married. The English alliance, it was hoped by the new French premier 
Cardinal Richelieu, would alienate the Protestant English from their Huguenot brethren 
and tie the Stuarts more firmly to the interests of the French monarchy.203 
 Mansfeld’s presence in London during this major shift in Stuart foreign policy 
brought him to the attention of the French. Indirect war against the Habsburgs was part 
of Richelieu’s ambitious foreign policy, and employing Mansfeld as a proxy served well 
the interests of the Cardinal’s raison d’état. At the core of the Cardinal’s foreign policy 
stood the idea of France’s natural borders. The idea of ‘natural’ borders was alien to 
most seventeenth-century minds, because borders, to the extent they were even 
perceived to exist, were first and foremost feudal demarcation lines marking the end of 
one fiefdom and the beginning of another. Warfare along such frontiers was bound to be 
ambiguous and even asymmetrical, as the combatants usually had one foot on each side 
of the feudal boundary. Individuals like Charles IV of Lorraine were tied by feudal 
vassalage to both the Emperor and the French King, and it is hardly surprising that by 
exploiting his ambiguous position between two feudal overlords, Charles IV later 
evolved into one of Europe’s foremost military entrepreneurs. 
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 Richelieu never planned to restore the borders of ancient Gaul, as the French 
historian V. L. Tapié quite rightly pointed out.204 Therefore Richelieu’s natural borders 
did not represent a design for proto-nationalistic expansion, but rather a desire to use 
geographical barriers to bolster France’s defences against her enemies, and conversely, 
to exploit weak points along the Empire’s feudal borders and (in particular) along the 
long and winding Spanish military road from Italy to Flanders. The Valtelline was an 
obvious choke point, and in 1623 Mansfeld had indeed offered to fight the Spaniards 
there on behalf of Louis XIII. The prospect was seriously considered by the French, 
who were at the time planning a joint campaign in the Valtelline with Venice and 
Savoy. Mansfeld, it was visualized in Paris, might provide a useful diversion against the 
Habsburgs with his operations from East Frisia.205 The projected diversionary war 
would have taken in place in the Spanish-occupied Franche Comté, through which the 
Spanish military road traversed.206 The French planned to send Mansfeld auxiliaries, 
which would have increased Mansfeld’s troop strength to 25,000. Meanwhile, however, 
the nascent anti-Habsburg coalition agreed to subsidize Mansfeld with 60,000 écus, of 
which sum France paid half, Venice 20,000 écus, and Savoy 10,000.207 However, such 
diversionary war called for the existence of a solid anti-Habsburg coalition. 
 
5.4 Mansfeld and the Anti-Habsburg Coalition 
 
The anti-Habsburg coalition, as it existed, suffered from several contradictions. Firstly, 
the coalition of France, Savoy, and Venice was something of an alliance of 
convenience. The three powers rarely saw things eye to eye. For Richelieu the primary 
military-political goal was to secure the frontiere naturèlle by setting up a buffer zone 
of client states along the Franco-Imperial border.208 Venetian concerns, on the other 
hand, were limited to the defence of the Terra Firma, while the Savoyard plan was to 
wage diversionary war against the Habsburgs on all fronts, from Italy and Transylvania 
to Franche Comté and the Netherlands. The benefit for Casa Savoia was obvious, 
because the plan shifted the burden of warfare from Savoy to other powers. Secondly, 
France’s own designs in the Empire contradicted each other. France wanted to suppress 
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the growth of Habsburg power in the Empire, but without taking action against Duke 
Maximilian and the three Ecclesiastical Electors. It goes without saying that in the 
prevailing situation, in which the opposing power blocks in the Empire were built on 
confessional solidarity, France could not hope to limit the effects of diversionary 
warfare to the Habsburgs only, without inflicting at least some degree of collateral 
damage on other Catholic princes as well. Thirdly, indirect warfare could not be waged 
on German soil without the participation of Protestant powers. 
For Catholic France, co-operation with Protestant powers seemed an insurmountable 
obstacle. Charles Emmanuel’s ambitious plan for simultaneous war on all fronts 
interested Richelieu, but selling the idea to the Catholic French was tricky. Richelieu 
certainly tried that. In 1625 a political pamphlet titled La ligue necessaire or The 
necessarie league was published in France and England. The pamphlet’s argumentation 
bore more than just few traces of Richelieu’s raison d’état, which suggests that the 
pamphlet had been commissioned by the Cardinal himself. The pamphlet criticized the 
existing league between France, Savoy, and Venice. One of the crucial defects of the 
Catholic confederacy, the pamphlet pointed out, was its failure to retain the services of 
Mansfeld. Neither could the existing league effectively perform its other functions: “The 
head is good, the two shoulders which haue vntill this time contributed to the vpholding, and 
action of it, want no good will; but their armes are not long enough.”209 The anonymous 
author begged the French to put aside their prejudices towards the Protestants, and to 
form a new confederacy with England, Denmark, Sweden, the United Provinces, the 
Hanseatic cities, Bethlen Gabor, and the German Protestant princes.210 Venice was then 
urged to pay its subsidies to Mansfeld with increased diligence, while the scheming 
Charles Emmanuel was reminded, “that this Union is not onely made for you.”211 
Forming an inter-confessional alliance against the Habsburgs proved difficult. The 
French Catholics were not the only ones who were suspicious of those who did not 
share their religious outlook. Christian IV was particularly outspoken about his mistrust 
of the French. To Christian IV, the confessional divide was an insurmountable barrier 
that prevented a close union between France and the Protestant powers of Europe.212 
Christian IV also had his doubts regarding the depth of French commitment to the 
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common endeavour and their ability to bear the burdens of war.213 So too did the Dutch 
and the Brandenburgers, who introduced a new champion for the anti-Habsburg cause, 
Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden. 
In 1624 the Brandenburger envoy Christian von Bellin began to advocate Swedish 
participation in the newly forming Evangelical alliance. The French, whom Bellin 
deemed “too Jesuitical,” had no central part to play in the new arrangement.214 Bellin and 
Gustavus Adolphus had devised their own plan for diversionary war, in which the 
Swedes would have landed at Bremen on the North Sea coast, and then continued their 
advance south along the River Weser. For this reason the plan was dubbed the ‘Weser 
Plan.’215 Even though the Weser Plan called for Swedish supremacy in the actual 
fighting and decision-making, it did make provision for Mansfeld’s presence as well. 
Already in 1623 the Swedish King had envisioned a two-pronged attack against the 
Erbländer, in which plan Mansfeld and Brunswick were expected to play their parts. 
While the Swedes advanced from the north, Gustavus Adolphus suggested, Brunswick 
and Mansfeld might carry out a diversionary campaign in the south and invade the 
Erbländer through Saxony and Altmark.216 The plan was, in a word, absurd. Gustavus 
Adolphus demanded the creation of an Anglo-Dutch-Swedish North Sea fleet under his 
own personal command, which from the Danish perspective was an utterly unacceptable 
proposition.217 In addition to that, the Weser Plan required from the English and the 
Dutch the kind of military and economic resources they did not possess. When the 
Protestant allies and France met in the Hague conference in early 1625, the Weser Plan 
was finally buried, and the command of the anti-Habsburg campaign was officially 
conferred to Christian IV.218 
 
When Mansfeld landed on the Dutch coast in early 1625, he was officially in the pay of 
England, France, and the United Provinces. The original plan was to land in Calais, and 
to move thence towards the east, while collecting fresh French recruits along the way.219 
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Louis XIII, however, was appalled by the though that Europe’s foremost freebooter and 
his mercenary horde would make their presence felt in France. The French King’s 
anxiety reveals the central predicament in seventeenth-century diversionary warfare: 
such method of warfare only worked beyond one’s own territory, because mercenaries 
like Mansfeld were an equal scourge to friendly and non-friendly territories alike. Louis 
XIII therefore suggested an alternative landing site at Bergen-op-Zoom, which would 
allow Mansfeld to circumnavigate “the hindrances and great preparations, which had been 
set up against him on the route of Flanders and Artois.”220 In addition to helping him avoid 
any unwanted attention, the new route of attack would allow Mansfeld to surprise the 
besieging Spaniards at Breda, Louis XIII insisted.221 His premiere Cardinal Richelieu 
echoed the King’s sentiments: Mansfeld’s transit to Germany, the Cardinal instructed 
Mansfeld’s agent, would be easier through the Netherlands than Artois, as a contingent 
of Tilly’s army awaited Mansfeld at Alsace.222 
 The fall of Breda in June 1625 rearranged the priorities of Mansfeld’s diversionary 
warfare. The Dutch had only employed Mansfeld in the vain hope that his mercenary 
force might help the Prince of Orange relieve the beleaguered city; after Spinola 
allowed the Breda garrison to march out of the ruined city and regroup with Prince 
Frederick Henry’s army, the need for Mansfeld’s services ceased to exist. The English 
were equally anxious to see Mansfeld leave the Netherlands and join Christian IV of 
Denmark, to whom Charles I had pledged his military assistance. Louis XIII and 
Richelieu, on the other hand, were simply relieved to see Mansfeld move away from 
France. 
 Mansfeld’s lifeline to England, France, and the United Provinces remained in 
existence even after Mansfeld transferred his theatre of operations to northern Germany. 
The Dutch, despite having avowed in July “never to have anything to do with him in the 
future,”223 still dispatched 3,000 infantrymen and 500 riders to Mansfeld’s aid, after 
much of his original Anglo-French contingent had dispersed due to lack of money and 
forage.224 England promised to subsidize the Lower Saxon war with £50,000 per month, 
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of which sum £20,000 was to be reserved for Mansfeld.225 In October 1625 the English 
also managed to send reinforcements through Bremen, while at the same time a French 
subsidy of 200,000 gulden was finally made available to Mansfeld.226 
 Mansfeld’s role as a proxy in French and English pay complicated matters of war 
and peace in the Lower Saxon Circle. When Tilly and the Lower Saxon Estates 
attempted to negotiate a cease-fire in the winter of 1625-1626, the Emperor decreed 
that, “Mansfeld, as an outlaw, would be utterly excluded from the cessation of arms.”227 No 
effective cease-fire could therefore take place, if a military-political player of 
Mansfeld’s calibre was to be excluded from all negotiated settlements. In addition to the 
difficulties in peace making, Mansfeld’s ambiguous position as a hired non-state 
operator made matters of military direction difficult for Christian IV. While agreeing on 
the monthly subsidy, the new English King Charles I had also promised to place 
Mansfeld under Danish command with the rank of Lieutenant General. This gesture was 
a serious affront to Mansfeld, who cherished his independence and was loath to serve 
Christian IV in such a lowly position. According to Villermont, Mansfeld then made up 
his mind to seek service in Venice, where he might secure himself a far more illustrious 
rank of Commander in Chief.228  
Meanwhile, disobedience to Christian IV was to be the order of the day. Mansfeld 
had initially made quarters at Bremen, but the city’s proximity to the Danish King 
discomforted Mansfeld to no end. After having received Dutch reinforcements and 
French subsidies, Mansfeld moved into the Duchy of Luneburg, which he proceeded to 
thoroughly pillage.229 Mansfeld then pursued his itinerary across the Elbe and into the 
pastures of Mecklenburg. Furious protests from the Duke Christian of Luneburg-Celle, 
the burghers of Lubeck, and the Dukes of Mecklenburg all received the same cold and 
indifferent response from Christian IV: Mansfeld was acting on his own authority, and 
the Danish King could not reign him in.230 
 At the outset of the 1626 campaign, Christian IV resolved the conundrum of 
Mansfeld’s insubordination by granting him a separate command. The King’s move was 
practical, as Mansfeld never ceased to work as an agent for foreign benefactors. Even 
after the disastrous defeat at Dessau, where Mansfeld lost his entire Dutch contingent, 
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foreign involvement still remained an essential part of Mansfeld’s military enterprise. 
Mansfeld managed to rebuild his army in Altmark largely due to foreign help: nearly 
half of the new recruits arrived from Sweden, Denmark, Scotland, and other foreign 
countries. Even the French still continued to subsidize Mansfeld and his army.231 
 
5.5 Mansfeld and His Diversionary War in the Habsburg Lands 
 
Mansfeld’s final campaign in Silesia and Moravia was rich with diversionary war 
aspects. The Silesian campaign was, in effect, the only part of the ambitious Weser Plan 
that was ever carried out, as Mansfeld’s sudden and unexpected plunge into the 
Erbländer distracted the Imperialists and forced Wallenstein to disengage from the war 
in Lower Saxony and rush to the aid of the Emperor’s endangered estates. The 
downside for the Emperor’s enemies was the fact that there was hardly anyone left in 
northern Germany to exploit Mansfeld’s opportune diversion. 
 The potential for a diversionary campaign was realized further south, in Transylvania 
and Ottoman-held Hungary. In his letter to Joachim Ernest of Saxe-Weimar, Mansfeld 
explained that the purpose of the Silesian campaign was to make conjunction with 
Bethlen Gabor and by that way to further distract the common enemy.232 Bethlen Gabor 
himself had proposed such co-operation to the Protestant delegates gathered at The 
Hague the year before. The plan suggested by Bethlen Gabor was anything but modest: 
it entailed co-operation between Transylvania, the Protestants rulers of northern Europe, 
the Ottomans, and even the Crimean Tartars. The Transylvanians and the Ottomans, 
Bethlen Gabor had suggested, would advance with two armies through Hungary and 
penetrate deep into the Austrian Erbländer in Styria, Illyria, and Croatia; meanwhile the 
Tartars would pour into Poland and neutralize that country as a potential threat to the 
Protestant alliance.233 However, upon witnessing the disunity among the participants in 
The Hague conference, the Transylvanian envoy declined to join the embryonic 
Evangelical alliance.234 
 After the setback at Dessau, Bethlen Gabor’s original plan was partially revived by 
Mansfeld and Christian IV. The Erbländer still remained the final military objective, 
but instead of following the Elbe, as Bethlen Gabor had originally suggested, 
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Mansfeld’s new route of attack was to be the River Oder.235 The new diversion echoed 
the objective of the late Weser Plan, which had aimed at separating the armies 
Wallenstein and Tilly. Christian IV supported the diversion by paying Bethlen Gabor a 
subsidy of 10,000 thalers for three months, and by allocating Mansfeld 7,000 Danish 
troops under the supervision of Commissarius Joachim Mitzlaff.236 
 Mansfeld’s last campaign remained a distinctive one due to the presence of Turkish 
auxiliaries. The Turkish motives for providing military assistance to Bethlen Gabor and 
Mansfeld is a matter of debate. Some conjecture can, however, be made. The move for 
Turkish participation was made by the Pasha of Buda, who seems to have operated out 
of his own initiative. As the Pasha’s main responsibility was to monitor the volatile 
border regions between the Ottoman Empire and Austria, it can be concluded that the 
Pasha sent his Janissaries to restrain diversionary warfare rather than to wage it. As the 
Ottomans had become engaged in a bloody war in Iraq against the Iranian Safavids, the 
Sultan had little desire to violate the peace with Austria.237 It is therefore likely that the 
Janissaries were sent to supervise Bethlen Gabor and Mansfeld, and to make sure that 
the German war would not spill into the Turkish-held Hungary. This theory is supported 
by the fact that the Janissaries appear to have been under instructions not to engage the 
Imperialists themselves. When Mansfeld did place some of the Janissaries in his front 
ranks, the Turks complained bitterly and made every effort to avoid combat with 
Wallenstein’s vanguard units.238 Sydnam Poyntz even suggested that Mansfeld’s 
unauthorized use of Turkish military assets induced the Pasha of Belgrade to assassinate 
him.239 Poyntz’s imaginative conspiracy theory falls flat before the inconvenient fact 
that the Janissaries in Mansfeld’s army belonged to the Pasha of Buda, not that of 
Belgrade. Another, equally plausible theory is that Bethlen Gabor simply goaded the 
Turks into sending him military aid. This theory is supported by Sir Thomas Roe’s 
diplomatic dispatches from Constantinople, which suggest that the Transylvanian prince 
grossly exaggerated to his Ottoman overlords the threat posed by Wallenstein and the 
Imperial Army.240 
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 The diversion was ultimately one of mixed success. For Mansfeld himself the 
diversionary campaign into the Erbländer spelled doom: Bethlen Gabor appeared late 
on the scene, and when he did finally confront Wallenstein, he quickly made peace 
again and disappeared back into the Transylvanian wilderness. Mansfeld, who was 
excluded from the peace negotiations, made his way further south, where his army 
dissolved and he himself succumbed to disease. However, the diversion also harmed the 
Habsburg war effort. Both the overall condition of the Imperial Army and Wallenstein’s 
personal relations with Vienna had suffered considerably as a result of the hasty and ill-
prepared campaign into the Austro-Hungarian borderlands. The same pestilence, which 
had claimed the lives of Mansfeld and Saxe-Weimar, also wreaked havoc among 
Wallenstein’s soldiers. Of the 20,000 soldiers who started out from the Elbe, only 5,000 
were left by the end of the campaign.241 The lack of supplies, on the other hand, forced 
the Imperialists to extract resources from the Erbländer. The subjection of the 
Emperor’s Erbländer to the vicissitudes of contributions and billeting inevitably lead to 
the deterioration of relations between Wallenstein and the Hofkriegsrat. Vienna was rife 
with accusations that Wallenstein had devastated Habsburg Erbländer and magnate 
demesnes on purpose; Prince Liechtenstein and Cardinal Dietrichstein, whose Moravian 
estates had fared worst at the hands of both Mansfeld’s mercenaries and Wallenstein’s 
Imperialists, were more incensed than anyone else. It was fairly easy for Wallenstein to 
clear himself of all blame, as the expedition to the Erbländer had been undertaken 
contrary to his own advice.242 Nevertheless, the incident left a stain on Wallenstein’s 
personal reputation, and made him powerful enemies in the Viennese Court. 
 While Wallenstein battled the Imperial Court, Mansfeld perished in distant Bosnia. 
Even in the last days of his life, Mansfeld’s mind was still alive with new plans for 
diversionary warfare, despite the fact that his French paymasters had abandoned him as 
a result of the Franco-Spanish peace treaty at Monzon.243 The English too were 
disinclined to subsidize any further operations on the Continent, as their own military 
expedition against Cadiz had turned out a costly failure.244 There is therefore little doubt 
that Mansfeld was seeking new employment in Venice – he had, in fact, boasted to his 
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soldiers that a large cache of money awaited him there.245 At that time trouble was 
brewing in the disputed Duchy of Mantua, and it is likely that Mansfeld would have 
found new employment in the emerging conflicts between Mantua, Savoy, Venice, 
France, Spain, and the Emperor.  
The journey to Venice through Dalmatia and Bosnia was long and exacting, and in 
order to cover his travel expenses Mansfeld borrowed 1,000 ducats from Bethlen Gabor. 
As a security for this loan Mansfeld pledged his artillery and munitions to Bethlen 
Gabor.246 Mansfeld also toyed with the idea of allowing his French engineers to teach 
the Turks “the Christian manner of fight and withall the Christian manner of fortifications” - 
for an appropriate fee, naturally.247 It remains unclear whether his French engineers ever 
found employment as military advisors to the Turks, or whether they too vanished into 
the slave markets of Buda like the rest of Mansfeld’s army. If such military assistance 
were in fact given, it would have counted as Mansfeld’s final involvement in indirect 
warfare. 
 
6. IMAGE AND INFORMATION WAR 
 
6.1 Propaganda and Apologies 
 
The Thirty Years War was the first war in which all the participants engaged in large-
scale and purposeful efforts to spread propaganda and misinformation. The ability to 
wage information war depended on a new innovation, the printing press, which spewed 
out propaganda, information, and rumour in various forms, be they pamphlets, booklets, 
or even primitive newspapers. Woodcuts and copper engravings allowed pictures to be 
presented alongside printed text, and new possibilities emerged for the use of visual 
image as a tool in the emerging information warfare. 
 The term ‘propaganda’ itself originates from the period of the Thirty Years War. The 
Latin word propaganda is not a noun but a gerundive. The word first appeared in the 
name of the Counter-Reformationist organization Congregatio de Propaganda Fidei, or 
the Congregation for the Propagation of Faith. The Congregatio de Propaganda Fidei, 
or simply Propaganda, was founded in 1622 by the Pope Gregory XV to help the 
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Catholic Church derive maximum benefits from the victories of Ferdinand II against the 
Protestant Estates of Germany. In practice the Propaganda trained and dispatched 
missionaries to take control over the formerly secularised princedoms in Germany, and 
to carry out the work of conversion there.248 The word ‘propaganda’ has derived its 
modern meaning from the publicity efforts of the Propaganda to idolize the Catholic 
leadership and to smear the reputation of their Protestant opponents. 
 The true pioneers of early modern propaganda warfare were not, however, the 
Counter-Reformationist clerics, but their Protestant antagonists. One propaganda 
medium particularly characteristic to Protestants in the early years of the Thirty Years 
War was the public apology. These works were not apologies in the literal meaning of 
the word, but rather justifications for anti-seigneuralism, anti-clericalism, and other 
forms of radical or rebellious conduct. The Bohemian Rebels were particularly prolific 
apologists, producing a number of apologies for the defenestration of Slavata and 
Martinic, as well as for their expulsion of Jesuits from Bohemia. Such apologies were 
circulated throughout western Europe and translated many times over: one particular 
English imprint produced by George Purslow was a translation of a Latin text, which in 
itself was a translation of the German original.249 The contested throne of Bohemia 
provided a setting for another war of pamphleteers. Both Frederick V and Ferdinand II 
defended their own claims on the Bohemian throne by arguing in widely circulated 
dissertations on behalf of either the elective or hereditary nature of the Bohemian 
monarchy. 
 Taking the cue from the Bohemian publicists, Mansfeld produced an apology of his 
own in 1621. The apology was aimed at those potential friends and allies, who might 
have been miffed by the Mansfelders’ poor conduct in Bohemia, as well as by the 
perfidious abandonment of Pilsen.250 Mansfeld was particularly worried that potential 
benefactors abroad, “who haue liued so farre off from newes, that they neuer heard him so 
much as suspect,” might have been put off from subsidizing his war effort by malicious 
rumours, and for this reason the apology was aimed at a larger international audience.251  
The Appollogie of Mansfield was hardly a pioneering publicity job. Walter 
Krüssmann, who has admirably deconstructed the apology, has discovered a number of 
forerunners for Mansfeld’s tract, works such as William of Orange’s Apologie ou 
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défense de Guillaume Prince d’Orange from 1581 and the res gestae tradition of 
Roman Classicists. What set Mansfeld’s apology apart from any previous propagandist 
tracts, however, were the conditions under which it was produced. The wording of the 
apology, Krüssmann argues, was formulated at Mansfeld’s field chancellery, which at 
the time of the writing was in winter quarters at Haguenau.252 Haguenau is also the 
place where the original German version of the text was most likely printed; it is 
unlikely that Mansfeld possessed a portable printing press of his own, but because 
printing presses were common throughout Germany and could be found in towns even 
smaller than Haguenau, producing copies of the text was a relatively easy thing to do. 
Mansfeld’s enemies conversely faced an insurmountable task in limiting his ability to 
print his own propaganda, as the German cities, where most of the printing presses were 
situated, were by and large in the hands of Lutherans and Calvinists. Mansfeld’s 
connections with the latter group also facilitated the circulation of his apology. The 
French translation appeared in 1622, and copies of it spread through the Calvinist 
printing presses in Strasbourg and Amsterdam.253 An English translation appeared that 
very same year in the Palatine capitol of Heidelberg, whence it immediately made its 
way to London. The urban, multilingual, and internationally connected Calvinist world 
was like a super highway of information, where the Catholic Emperor had no powers of 
moderation or censorship. 
 
The propaganda war was asymmetrical in a way that did not necessarily operate to 
Mansfeld’s advantage. His status as an illegitimate offspring and a private military 
entrepreneur left him vulnerable to aggressive enemy propaganda, which – unlike his 
own apology – aimed at slandering and vilifying the opponent rather than passively 
defending one’s own actions. Adolf Hitler, the most enthralling propagandist of the 
modern age, viewed exactly this kind of aggressive propaganda as the most effective 
form, one that dehumanised the enemy and intimated the audience at home. Hitler was 
particularly impressed by the ‘atrocity propaganda’ of the Western Allies, which drew 
its material from the German atrocities in Belgium and extrapolated them into 
scandalous proportions. Such propaganda, Hitler believed, was successful because it 
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“took into account the emotional, always extreme, attitude of the great masses and for this 
reason was believed.”254  
The seventeenth-century German public was no less emotional than that of the 
twentieth century, and stories of Mansfeld’s atrocities found a receptive audience. The 
horror stories circulated mainly through the embryonic newspapers in Germany and 
abroad. The Frankfurt newsletter Theatrum Europaeum, which attempted to maintain an 
imbalanced view of the tragic events, reported all major atrocities carried out by any 
parties. The French Mercure François more or less followed suit. The only press that 
consistently presented Mansfeld in an uncritical light was that of England.  
The Imperialists were newcomers to the propaganda war, and they failed to 
produce the kind of polemical atrocity propaganda that could have competed with the 
Protestant pamphlets. Among the Imperialists, the stories of Mansfeld’s excesses 
survived best in the memoirs of influential courtiers and priests, like those of Carlo 
Caraffa and Count Khevenhüller. The latter person referred to Mansfeld as “der Bastardt 
Mannsfeld,” which expression later recurred in Villermont’s biography.255 Nuncio 
Caraffa, on the other hand, made his best effort to portray Mansfeld as a sacrilegious 
defiler of altars and destroyer of churches.256 
In a way the Imperialists did not even have to engage in propaganda war against 
Mansfeld, because Mansfeld himself did the work for them. The Achilles’ heel in 
Mansfeld’s image war was the fact that the stories of his excesses and atrocities were 
mostly true. We have already encountered Sydnam Poyntz’s testimony of the massacre 
at Weisshausen, but there were other impartial witnesses who testified of Mansfeld’s 
cruelties. The Strasbourg diarist Johann Walter was one of them. In the autumn of 1621 
Walter wrote down in his diary the following condemning entry: 
 
1621. The country has begun to feel the turmoil of war. At the beginning of autumn Count 
Ernst von Mansfeld arrived with his undisciplined hordes at Haguenau in Alsace, which city 
he took almost without opposition, and which undoubtedly will be forced to hand him a 
huge sum of money. The Jews there have been forced to carry a particularly heavy burden. 
Then Mansfeld’s godless people ruined the whole country with their robbing, burning, 
defiling, and awful dwelling, in a way that was never heard before. Looking around from the 
city, there was nothing but conflagrations in the villages; you could count 16 or more 
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frequent fires at once. Those of the poor country people who could escape came to the city 
with their wives and children, and some even brought their cattle. But under the 
circumstances many of the cattle had to be left behind, and died of hunger. Therefore the city 
was crowded with people to such extent that it was quite indescribable. This led to a cruel 
cost of living, and soon there was no longer any bread available. This misery has continued 
throughout the autumn.257 
 
It is likely that the likes of Johann Walter, who had first hand experience of Mansfeld 
and his unfettered warfare, had already made up their minds about Mansfeld and that 
the Imperialist propaganda therefore only further enforced existing images. 
 
6.2 Mansfeld Defamed and Ridiculed 
 
Mansfeld’s apology induced his enemies to produce an antithesis of their own, called 
the Acta Mansfeldica. This tract did not originate from the printing presses of the 
Propaganda, but from Bavaria, whose Duke wished to see Mansfeld alienated from his 
German supporters.258 Murder, robbery, arson, and rape were daily occurrences among 
Mansfeld’s undisciplined troops, the Acta Mansfeldica proclaimed, and the only person 
responsible for this scandalous state of affairs was Mansfeld himself, who, contrary to 
the established norms of the age, failed to regulate the conduct of his soldiers.259 The 
picture the Acta Mansfeldica wanted to paint of Mansfeld was that of a capricious and 
unprofessional condottiere, whose loyalty and conduct could not be relied on. By 
modern standards the propaganda in Acta Mansfeldica comes across as somewhat 
subdued. Mansfeld’s war crimes would have provided much ammunition for the kind of 
dehumanising atrocity propaganda that appealed to Adolf Hitler, but the Acta 
Mansfeldica took the high road instead and concentrates on undermining Mansfeld’s 
standing as a member of the noble estate. Such an approach reflects the hierarchical and 
self-conscious mentality of the seventeenth-century nobility, who valued their standing 
among peers above all else. A nobleman of suspect birth like Mansfeld, who could not 
maintain discipline among his troops and whose word could not be counted on, was 
bound to be marginalized by his peers and shunned by princely employers, which was 
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exactly the effect Acta Mansfeldica hoped to achieve. The image painted by Acta 
Mansfeldica still persisted in Count Villermont’s hostile biography.260 
The Acta Mansfeldica was not the only polemical work that aimed at ridiculing and 
defaming Mansfeld. There also exists a delightful satirical verse from the period of 
1624-1626, which has survived in manuscript form in the archives of Wolfenbüttel. In 
1862 the historians Julius Otto Opel and Adolf Cohn published the verse in their 
collection of folk songs from the era of the Thirty Years War.261 It was this particular 
song, the Mansfeldisch Trommenschlag, which established Mansfeld’s reputation as the 
new Attila, “Clericorum Attilam,” the scourge of the Catholic Church.262 This epithet too 
made its way into Villermont’s unsympathetic book.  
The song catalogued Mansfeld’s many adventures and escapades, some of them less 
reputable than others: 
 
Zog er in Bohemiam/Und hindurch Silesiam/Transit in Moraviam/Half verderben 
Austriam/Durch List Bavariam/Liberat Frankenthaliam/Jagt hinweg den Cordubam/Lucratus 
est Hagnoam/Und erschreckt Alsatiam/Weil er war den Tilly gram/Macht er des Armada 
lahm/Apud Mingelshemiam/Zog wider in Alsatiam/Trieb hinweg mit Forcht und 
Schaam/Leopoldi gloriam/Brannt per Lotharingiam/Nahm sein Weg in Galliam/Schlug sich 
durch per Fleriam/Bis er kam in Belgiam/Macht zu Spott den Spinolam/Als er belägert 
Bergam/Zog hernach in Frisiam/Simul et Holsatiam/Ram, Ram wider Ram/Kam wider in 
Galliam…263 
 
The Mansfeldisch Trommenschlag is not, however, a hostile Catholic verse, but a 
Protestant mockery, which makes fun of both Mansfeld and his Catholic opponents. In 
fact, the most scandalous verses are aimed at the Catholic clergy and their allegedly 
impious lifestyle: 
 
Verführt dein clericum/Das lieb Christenthum/Verfolgt um und um/Dein Sachen stehn gar 
krumm/Nam per sanctissimum/Apostolorum/Quorum numerum/Habes consortium/Et 
meretricum/Et sodomiticum…264 
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The undercurrent of ridicule also existed in the visual representation of Mansfeld’s 
activities. The pamphlet Labor vincit omnia from 1622 portrays a lampoonist image of 
Mansfeld, who ploughs through the ecclesiastical territories with his army, while the 
prince-bishops sow coins in his trail. The pamphlet apparently implies that Mansfeld’s 
sole political aim was the farming of contributions and the upkeep of his private 
military enterprise.265 Once again, the publicists’ innuendo contained more than just few 
grains of truth. 
 There also existed a series of pro-Habsburg pamphlets that were something more 
than just straightforward political propaganda. The pamphlets, which ran under the title 
Altera secretissima instructio, attempted to affect the Palatine Elector’s decision-
making through insidious dissimulation and misinformation. The first pamphlet 
appeared in 1620, when, according to the Mercure François, it was being circulated at the 
meeting of the Protestant union and Catholic League representatives in Ulm.266 By 1627 
the pamphlets had reached England. The Altera secretissima instructio tried to sway the 
Palatinate’s foreign policy by appealing to the theory of raison d’état, which most likely 
was the reason why the aspiring political scientist Thomas Hobbes chose to translate the 
tract in English. 
The pamphlets made their case by portraying the Palatinate’s foreign allies as self-
serving and untrustworthy. Of Christian IV the pamphlet had the following things to 
say: “He auoydes battle, and lookes about how to fly…He thinkes of his owne augmentation, 
not at all of yor restitution, but to make it a pretext.“267 Of the United Provinces: “The high 
and mighty states of ye Low Contries will not restore you. The name of an exile lying on their 
hands is cheape amongst them. It is a burdesome thinge…They are squeamish at your pouerty, 
and laugh in their sleeue at the imitation of dignity royall, in beggary.”268 Of France: “It is 
neuer safe to trust to French Papistes. Made they not peace without ye knowledge of their allies? 
Yet in that league consisted of your safety and ye growth and glory of all the confederate 
Kinges.”269 Of Bethlen Gabor: “Therefore Gabor also forsakes vs. He seekes for mony, which 
gotten, he shewes his forces, but bringes them not on. He selles vncertaynties, at a certayne 
price. He also, persuades you to Peace, and condemnes all our Counsells and discloses them. So 
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he gratifyes Caesar.”270 And finally, the pamphlet had a few words to say about Mansfeld 
as well:  
 
What do wee promise to our selues from Mansfelt. When flyes he not? Carelesse of ye 
warre, greedy for booty, easier to be gotten in peacefull contryes, then in that of ye enemy. 
Fitter for nothinge, then of frends to make enemyes, and of enemyes victors. Witnesse 
Lubecke, Saxony, Brandenburgh. Gabor also before the Emperor complayned of him, saying 
I lament not his defeate, he himselfe cares not for it, beinge a man that sets much by prey, 
but little by the bloud of his soldiers.271 
 
 
6.3 The Acta Bohemica and the Imperialist Information War 
 
Because the abovementioned characterizations, despite being hostile and politically 
motivated, contained much truth about the Elector’s allies, the Altera secretissima 
instructio traversed the ground between image and information war. However, the 
Altera secretissima instructio did not remain the only instance where information war 
impacted Mansfeld. During the period under our investigation, Mansfeld and his 
Imperialist adversaries became involved in a series of publicity incidents similar to the 
Wikileaks scandal of our own times. On two occasions the Imperialists gained 
possession of sensitive correspondence that was damaging to Mansfeld and his 
employers, and on another Mansfeld himself intercepted Imperialists communications 
that proved even more embarrassing to the Emperor. What connected these three events 
was the fact that, akin to the recent Wikileaks scandal, they all represented an aspect of 
asymmetrical warfare known as ‘white propaganda,’ or open information, whose 
originators and dispensers are made public, and the veracity of which cannot be 
therefore easily refuted.272 
 The first ‘white’ revelation occurred when Mansfeld’s field chancellery and the 
diplomatic correspondence it contained fell into Imperialist hands after the battle of 
Sablat. The captured correspondence described in detail the secret negotiations between 
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Heidelberg, Turin, and Venice.273 Understanding the importance of his discovery, the 
Imperialist General Buquoy dispatched the papers to Vienna, whence they were 
forwarded to Spain. The revelation of secret diplomacy between the Bohemians, the 
Palatinate, Venice, and Savoy had two important consequences. Firstly, it revealed to 
the Habsburgs the magnitude and aims of the international alliance directed against 
them: “The rebel plan aims to utterly destroy the sovereignty of the Habsburgs and the 
existence of the Catholic religion,” Count Oñate, the Spanish ambassador at Vienna, 
declared at the end of July 1619, “and to form an exclusively Calvinist confederation from 
the various lands under the sceptre of Ferdinand II, a regime under an elected king, whose 
authority would be diminished to such a degree that the entire government would rest in the 
hands of the Estates.”274 Secondly, Oñate’s public condemnation of the rebel plans also 
brought into the light Charles Emmanuel’s central role in the anti-Habsburg coalition, 
and seriously embarrassed the Savoyard Duke, when his designs to become the new 
King of Bohemia were thwarted by the rebellious Estates that very same summer. The 
loss of secret correspondence cost Mansfeld his main benefactor, as the embarrassed 
Charles Emmanuel, eager to salvage at least the remains of his decorum, hastily ended 
his subsidies to the Bohemian Rebels.275 
 The second ‘white propaganda’ incident affected Mansfeld less directly. The affair 
involved the Palatine state papers at Heidelberg, which fell into the hands of the 
Imperialists after Tilly conquered the city in September 1622. Mansfeld, whom 
Frederick V had discharged from his service in July, made no attempt to relieve the city. 
The conquering Leaguers thoroughly ransacked Heidelberg. Among the loot was the 
Elector’s valuable library, the Bibliotheca Palatina, which the Papal librarian Leone 
Allatius transported in its entirety to Rome.276  
The real prize, however, turned out to be the chancellery papers of the Elector’s 
foreign secretary, Prince Christian of Anhalt. The papers, which were soon published 
along with other documents captured after the Battle of the White Mountain as the Acta 
Bohemica, revealed the involvement of the Palatinate and Savoy in the Bohemian 
Rebellion, and the designs that Turin and Heidelberg had harboured for the Bohemian 
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throne.277 However, proving the culpability of the Palatine Elector to the outbreak of the 
war was already redundant, as the rebellion itself had been put out, the Palatine lands 
conquered, and Frederick V stripped of his titles and privileges as an Imperial Elector. 
Therefore the remaining value in the papers was in the unflattering way in which Anhalt 
had characterized the Palatinate’s various friends and potential allies. Because both John 
George of Saxony and Christian IV of Denmark had been considered as potential 
candidates for the Bohemian throne, the Acta Bohemica included Anhalt’s candid 
assessments of their respective personalities.  
Honesty rarely is a virtue in diplomatic affairs, and the characterizations that 
followed were bound to blush faces in Dresden and Copenhagen. John George, we learn 
from the Acta Bohemica, was obsessed with hunting, feasting, and drinking, often 
practicing the latter till the wee hours of the morning, when the servants finally helped 
the intoxicated Elector to bed.278 Christian IV, on the other hand, “indulged in adultery 
and lust that placed their subjects in peril and danger.”279 Some of the revelations shed light 
on the inner workings of Savoy, Saxony, and Denmark. John George was revealed to be 
the “natural enemy of noble privileges,” who distrusted the nobility and placed men of low 
birth to positions of influence.280 Charles Emmanuel, who had implied of his 
willingness to change religion in exchange for St Wenceslas’s Crown, was revealed by 
his former employee Mansfeld to have been a religious orthodox, who simply tried to 
bluff his way to the Bohemian throne.281 Christian IV was described as a rich and 
courageous monarch, who nevertheless was bound by the limits of Denmark’s 
aristocratic government, and who therefore “employed his riches for the profit of his 
offspring.”282 
 
6.4 The Cancelleria Hispanica and the Protestant Information War 
 
The third publicity incident had much more severe political repercussions than the two 
previous ones. This time, however, the fall-out was on the Emperor. The ‘white 
propaganda’ event began to unfold when Mansfeld intercepted Imperial correspondence 
in November 1621. The letters, which were addressed to the Papal envoy Father 
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Hyacinth in Brussels, were written by Ferdinand II himself.283 Enclosed with the letters 
were previous diplomatic documents for Father Hyacinth’s benefit. Realizing the value 
of his catch Mansfeld immediately sent the letters to Heidelberg, where they were 
thoroughly scrutinized by Ludwig Camerarius, the Palatine Elector’s chief diplomatic 
councillor. The following year the letters were published as a part of a polemical work 
known as Cancelleria Hispanica. The Cancelleria Hispanica was a brilliant indictment 
of the Habsburgs’ anti-Palatine politics. The letters, particularly the one addressed to the 
Spanish premier Don Balthasar Zuñiga, revealed how Ferdinand II had secretly 
promised to Duke Maximilian the transferral of the Palatine Electorate, its lands, titles, 
and privileges to Bavaria. In the letter Ferdinand II strove to convince the reluctant 
Spaniards that the transferral of the Electoral title to Bavaria would ensure that “the 
Empire would stay forever in the hands of the Catholics, and therefore also of our house.”284 As 
Ludwig Camerarius pointed out in his damning foreword to the Cancelleria Hispanica, 
such a clandestine transferral of the Electoral title violated the Emperor’s own 
Wahlkapitulationen, the Golden Bull, and the constitutional traditions of the Empire.285 
The publication of the Cancelleria Hispanica caused an outcry among the German 
Estates, and forced Ferdinand II to postpone the transferral of the Palatine Electorate.286 
The public revelation of the Habsburgs’ secret diplomacy also made it more difficult for 
Ferdinand II to win the backing of Spain for the planned transferral. Father Hyacinth 
was rapidly sent to Madrid, where he received only ambiguous answers from Philip IV. 
On one hand the Spanish King had appeared eager to facilitate the transfer before the 
Electoral College would meet to discuss the legitimacy of the affair, on the other Philip 
IV expressed only mild interest in making Duke Maximilian the new Elector Palatine.287 
Father Hyacinth finally left Madrid under the impression that Spain was generally 
opposed to the transferral.288 It was clear that the untimely publication of the 
Cancelleria Hispanica had encouraged Madrid to distance itself from the whole 
business. Another reason behind the confused and contradictory Spanish approach may 
have been Zuñiga’s death in October 1622, which left Madrid without an expert in 
German affairs.  
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Deprived of Spanish support, Ferdinand II only managed to gain an appearance of 
legitimacy for the transferral, when he convened a limited gathering of Imperial Princes 
in the Deputationstag of Regensburg in January 1623. The lack of domestic and foreign 
support for the dubious transferral of the Palatine Electorate forced Ferdinand II to 
retract some of his promises to Duke Maximilian, and to grant him the Palatine 
Electorate only for the duration of the Duke’s own life, therefore leaving the long-term 
ownership of the Palatinate open to dispute.289 Over time the Palatine dispute continued 
to fester, and ultimately provided the perfect excuse for Sweden and France to intervene 
in the German war and then to persist in the war until 1648, when the restoration of the 
Palatinate was finally achieved in the Westphalian peace settlement. 
 
7. REACTION TO MANSFELD AND HIS ASYMMETRICAL WARFARE 
 
7.1 The Emperor and the Problem of Asymmetry 
 
There remains one last aspect of asymmetrical warfare that needs to be considered. 
What kind of reactions or counter-measures did Mansfeld’s asymmetrical warfare draw 
from the Imperialists? All historical analogies of asymmetrical conflicts include 
attempts by the stronger side to reduce the impact of the enemy’s asymmetrical methods 
and thus to bring the conflict to the symmetrical level of war, where the opponent is 
forced to acknowledge his inferiority before a superior foe. In our own times such 
reactions and counter-measures to asymmetrical threats are collectively known as 
counter-insurgency (COIN) operations. 
 However, unlike the confrontation between the Clausewitzian notion of ‘big war’ 
and the small-scale guerrilla war that dominates the asymmetrical setting of our age, the 
asymmetry in the Thirty Years War arose from military paradigms that were rooted in 
the feudal societies and crusading wars of the Middle Ages. The kind of war the 
Austrian Habsburgs were prepared to wage was static and aimed at defending the 
Erbländer from Turkish incursions. This strategy was further consolidated by a Military 
Revolution in the art of fortification, which resulted in the proliferation of angle 
bastions, fortifications that were nearly impervious to contemporaneous siege tactics. 
The Habsburgs had introduced a skeleton force of regular soldiers to man these 
                                               
289 Ibid., p. 60 
 79
fortifications, but for all other contingencies they still relied on the resources provided 
to them by the Patrimonial Estates and the Reichstag. The Estates, who had neither the 
means nor the will to maintain standing armies, resorted to raising regiments for the 
duration of the campaign season and then disbanding them before the winter. 
 Mansfeld’s continuing private war after 1620 forced the Austrian Habsburgs to 
reconsider their practices. Ferdinand II had already taken steps to keep permanently in 
arms at least a part of his army during the Bohemian Rebellion, but the war’s sudden 
shift to Germany forced him to maintain unprecedented numbers of soldiers in the field. 
First the Emperor resorted to using allied armies, those of the Catholic League and 
Spain, but such outside help did not come free. Duke Maximilian held the Emperor’s 
own Erbländer in Upper Austria as a pledge against the expenses Bavaria had incurred 
during the Bohemian Rebellion, and could only be bought off with a promise of a seat 
in the Electoral College. Spain, on the other hand, slowly dragged Austria into its own 
separate wars in Italy and the Netherlands. 
 Mansfeld’s extended and unfettered warfare in Germany created an asymmetrical 
setting, in which the Emperor was unable to reciprocate his enemy’s measures. While 
Mansfeld could billet his troops by force, the Emperor could not; while Mansfeld could 
ransom contributions from the unwilling Estates, the Emperor could not; while 
Mansfeld could pillage ecclesiastical institutions, the Emperor could not; while 
Mansfeld could move his troops outside the Empire’s borders, the Emperor could not; 
while Mansfeld could escalate the war at will, the Emperor could not. It became 
increasingly obvious to Ferdinand II that the armies of Spain and the Catholic League 
could not be relied upon to effectively meet the various asymmetrical threats emanating 
from Mansfeld’s erratic warfare. 
 
7.2 Wallenstein and the Subcontracted Imperial Army 
 
From the perspective of asymmetrical warfare it makes perfect sense that the Emperor 
would choose to fight fire with fire and place the Imperial war effort into the hands of 
another military entrepreneur, Albrecht von Wallenstein. Indeed, Schiller even ventured 
to suggest that as far as methods of war financing were concerned, Wallenstein was 
Mansfeld’s committed disciple.290 The circumstances under which Wallenstein agreed 
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to subcontract an army for the Emperor are often presented in the traditional 
historiography as exigent. Indeed, such a view is perfectly justifiable: the Emperor 
really had few alternative methods for raising an army of his own. The Patrimonial 
Estates had largely defected to the enemy side during the Bohemian Rebellion, and the 
remaining loyalists in Tyrol, Styria, and Carinthia were too few and too impoverished to 
be able to furnish any sizeable contingents for Imperial service. The trustworthiness of 
the Patrimonial Estates was only restored after the radical constitutional changes in 
1627, when the Bohemian Crown was officially made hereditary in the Habsburg 
family, the Landtage amended with a clerical Estate, the Letter of Majesty abolished, 
the Protestant faith proscribed, and the local administration filled with men personally 
indebted to the Emperor.291 The resurrection of the feudal levy, the insurrectio, proved 
another failure. Ferdinand II had called his vassals to arms in 1617, when he (still then 
the Archduke of Carinthia) had fought the Venetians over Gradisca. At the time only a 
handful of Austrian and Bohemian noblemen had responded to their liege lord’s call. 
Among those few was Wallenstein, who had supplied Ferdinand II with 180 cuirassiers 
and 80 musketeers, whose upkeep and wages Wallenstein had paid from his own 
pocket.292 
 Despite such compelling reasons, Wallenstein’s rise and the creation of a 
subcontracted Imperial Army in 1625 can also be seen as a calculated response to the 
‘messy war’ waged by Mansfeld and other German military entrepreneurs. Even though 
the Emperor’s policies were largely driven by necessity, there still remained room for 
options in the recruitment and composition of the Imperial Army. The Emperor could 
have relied on Wallenstein only to recruit and finance the army, and then have placed 
the actual military command in his own hands – which he in fact did after Wallenstein’s 
assassination in 1634. This, however, the Emperor did not do in 1625, but insisted that 
Wallenstein himself should command the new army. As Golo Mann has pointed out, 
Wallenstein was initially reluctant to take up the burden of military leadership.293 When 
he did finally accept the command of the Imperial Army, Wallenstein imposed certain 
conditions on the Emperor that echoed the asymmetrical methods of Mansfeld. First of 
all Wallenstein demanded that the size of the planned Imperial Army would be 
increased from 20,000 to 50,000. Only the larger force, Wallenstein had insisted, would 
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allow the Imperial Army to spread itself over an area large enough to support the entire 
force.294 The second condition concerned the methods of extracting support. The 
Patrimonial Estates still being dysfunctional and unable to support the Imperial war 
effort, the war would have to be made to finance itself. For this purpose Wallenstein 
extracted from the Emperor an official instruction, in which the Emperor authorized 
Wallenstein to “collect tolerable contributions from the conquered areas.”295 While those 
Imperial Estates loyal to the Emperor were expected to be spared from the 
contributions, Wallenstein realized from the beginning that loyalists too would 
eventually have to be included in the sphere of the contributions.  
The Imperial instruction of June 1625 changed the nature of the Imperialists’ 
warfare. From there onwards the Imperialists would follow in the footsteps of Mansfeld 
and other asymmetrical warriors of the earlier stage of the war. Even though 
Wallenstein derived his authority from the Emperor, he still remained a private military 
entrepreneur, whose actions could not ultimately be blamed on the Emperor. The 
obfuscation in the limits of Wallenstein’s authority served the Emperor well. On one 
hand Wallenstein’s victories would serve to strengthen the Emperor’s prestige, on the 
other the Emperor could always distance himself from Wallenstein’s excesses by 
claiming that the responsibility for them lay with Wallenstein alone. And excesses there 
were. Wallenstein was not overshadowed by Mansfeld in ruthlessness, but in fact 
excelled him: “The scholar surpassed his master,” Schiller later wrote.296 The Imperial 
contributions ceased to be an imbursement paid upon the consent of the Imperial 
Estates, but were rather extracted by force. The dreaded Brandshatzung, so generously 
resorted to by Mansfeld and Brunswick, became a method of persuasion repeatedly used 
by Wallenstein. So too did forced billeting and winter-quartering, which were 
unilaterally imposed by Wallenstein on all the Imperial Estates – even those, which 
were part and parcel of the Habsburg Erbländer. 
By adopting the very methods by which the Emperor’s foremost enemies, the 
Protestant military entrepreneurs, had successfully waged asymmetrical warfare against 
the House of Austria, Wallenstein finally managed to gain the upper hand in the war. 
There is no doubt that the merit for the gradual pacification of Germany between 1625 
and 1629 belongs to the sizeable subcontracted Imperial Army under Wallenstein’s 
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command. An Imperial Army, which eventually grew to almost 150,000 men, and 
which fed off the German Estates like a gigantic parasite, effectively killed off all 
competition from other potential military entrepreneurs. The available credit for them 
was no longer there, and neither were the recruits, rewards, nor the supplies. During the 
period of Wallenstein’s greatest military success in 1625-1629, all those noble hotheads 
and callous mercenaries who wished to raise their own regiments and sell their services, 
were forced to seek employment with Wallenstein, who in fact expected all his Colonels 
and Captains to further subcontract the Imperial Army.297 
Once Wallenstein had embraced the asymmetrical methods of his enemies, the war 
ceased to be in any sense asymmetrical. The shift towards symmetrical, regulated, and 
state-monopolized warfare was further facilitated by the Swedish intervention in 1630. 
As a result, Wallenstein’s double position as the commander of the Imperial Army and a 
private military entrepreneur became increasingly awkward. Ferdinand II, who had little 
access to the credit markets, had been forced to borrow increasing sums from 
Wallenstein, whose position as a military entrepreneur provided him with reputable 
standing in the eyes of creditors all over Europe. As a security for these loans Ferdinand 
II had been forced to grant Wallenstein territories, privileges, and powers, which soon 
began to loom as potential threats to the Emperor’s own position. When rumours began 
to circulate in early 1634 that Wallenstein was secretly negotiating with the Swedes and 
aspiring to become the new Emperor himself, Ferdinand II decided to remove 
Wallenstein by force. The outcome of this decision was Wallenstein’s assassination at 
Eger in February 1634. The Imperial Army was brought under the Emperor’s control, 
and the Colonels, who had previously acted as independent subcontractors, became 
effectively salaried employees in the Emperor’s service.298  
All private armies and military confederations were finally banned in the 1635 peace 
agreement of Prague.299 Military entrepreneurs still survived, but they were being 
gradually integrated into the framework of state-monopolized warfare. The last great 
condottiere of the Thirty Years War, Duke Bernhard of Saxe-Weimar, in fact possessed 
a double role as a private military entrepreneur and a salaried state employee. In 1630-
1634 he served Sweden as a field commander, and indeed shared supreme command 
with Gustav Horn after the death of Gustavus Adolphus at Lützen. In 1635 Saxe-
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Weimar re-appeared as a military entrepreneur, when he agreed to raise force of 18,000 
men for French service in return for a payment of four million livres a year.300 In every 
other way Saxe-Weimar’s methods of warfare nevertheless matched symmetrically 
those of his enemies and allies.  
 
8. CONCLUSION 
 
Mansfeld and his conduct of warfare were asymmetrical in their operational dimension, 
their legalistic and moral deficiency, in the ways in which the war was made to finance 
itself, in Mansfeld’s role as an agent for indirect warfare, in the use and abuse of 
imagery and information as weapons of war, and in the response to an asymmetrical 
challenge that Mansfeld elicited from his enemies. The signifiers of symmetrical 
warfare, the clear political goals and the disposition to engage in decisive battles of 
annihilation, were conspicuously absent from Mansfeld’s warfare. 
 The asymmetry in the operational conduct of the arose from Mansfeld’s freedom of 
movement, which contrasted with the positional stance forced upon the Imperialists by 
the political circumstances in Germany and by the Habsburgs’ own military traditions, 
the latter being grounded in Austria’s on-going struggle with the Ottoman Empire. 
 Like most asymmetrical warriors of our time, Mansfeld too flouted the laws and 
moral norms of contemporaneous warfare. His enemies, once again, were not at liberty 
to follow suit, lest the legitimacy of the Emperor be undermined in the eyes of the 
German Estates and the Imperial subjects.  
 The most enduring legacy of asymmetrical warfare, and one that was more apparent 
than any other to Mansfeld’s contemporaries, was to be found in the manner in which 
Mansfeld and his Habsburg opponents raised, financed, and maintained military forces. 
As a private military entrepreneur Mansfeld enjoyed the kind of liberties that were not 
available to the embryonic Machtstaat of Habsburg Austria. Credit and plunder formed 
the sinews of war for Mansfeld, while the greatest asset available to his Habsburg 
enemies, the ability to raise taxes for the purpose of war-making, had not yet evolved to 
the level where taxes alone could help the state raise and maintain standing armies. 
 Images and information were asymmetrical weapons in the hands of anyone who 
used them. Mansfeld’s lowly status made him an object of revulsion and ridicule in the 
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eyes of his contemporaries. The Emperor, on the other, was imperilled by his own high 
status. As the highest authority in the Empire, the Emperor was expected to honour 
Imperial laws more vigilantly than anyone else. The revelations of his clandestine deals 
with Spain and Bavaria consequently harmed him more than the outrages and excesses 
in which Mansfeld had engaged. In the image war, it is the tall who fall the hardest. 
 Mansfeld’s asymmetrical warfare led to a counter-reaction, when his enemies sought 
to symmetrize war. That reaction was the formation of a subcontracted Imperial Army, 
whose recruitment, management, and command was placed in the hands of another 
military entrepreneur, Albrecht von Wallenstein. His adoption and refinement of 
Mansfeld’s asymmetrical methods had helped the Emperor to smother all flames of 
resistance in Germany by the end of 1629. The unanticipated success of Wallenstein’s 
warfare and its unforeseen collateral effects, however, escalated the war further, and 
finally lead to a situation, in which the Emperor felt imperilled enough to dismiss 
Wallenstein by force and assume the responsibility for the war himself. As a result the 
Thirty Years War took a giant leap towards the kind of state-monopolized, organised, 
and symmetrical warfare that prevailed from 1648 onwards. The contest for the 
monopoly of violence between military entrepreneurs and territorial states was 
ultimately decided in favour of the latter. 
The first generation of warfare thus began to take its shape, and Mansfeld’s 
asymmetrical ‘messy war’ began to look more and more out of date. During the 
centuries that followed, Mansfeld was being viewed by historians and military theorists 
as an anomaly, whose methods and conduct were difficult to fathom in the age of 
standing armies and centralised nation states. Only now that the territorial nation state is 
losing its monopoly of warfare to warlord militias, private security contractors, and 
other non-state agents, does Mansfeld’s asymmetrical warfare begin to remind us of the 
realities of contemporary war.  
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